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INTRODUCTION 
The Sherman Act of 1890 allows for the assessment of the competitive 
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effects of defendants’ activities.  Section One of the Sherman Act applies 
only to agreements between two or more actors.  A perplexing aspect of the 
agreement requirement of Section One is that sometimes two or more 
actors who are parties to an agreement are classified as one person, a 
“single entity.”  Since an agreement requires two or more distinct actors, 
the single entity fiction precludes finding the required agreement.  
Therefore, the agreements among actors within an economic unit deemed 
to be a single entity are invisible for purposes of Section One.  Because 
these agreements within a single entity are deemed not to exist for purposes 
of Section One, their competitive effects are not assessed.  Therefore, the 
single entity concept controls when the competitive effects of agreements 
will and will not be subject to Section One scrutiny.  This article (1) 
analyzes the theoretical foundation of the single entity concept and (2) 
proposes a sequential two-step test for determining when the preclusive 
effect of the single entity concept is justified. 
The first section of this article will examine the structure of the 
Sherman Act, focusing on the assessment of competitive effects of 
agreements under Section One.  Section II will analyze the efforts of the 
U.S. Supreme Court to address the limits of the single entity concept.  The 
Court has determined that corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries 
are incapable of conspiring for purposes of Section One and that teams 
forming the National Football League are separate entities unprotected by 
the single entity concept.   
Section III will analyze the impact of two contrasting theories of the 
firm on the single entity concept.  Ronald Coase’s groundbreaking 1937 
essay, The Nature of the Firm, fits neatly with the single entity concept.  
Coase viewed the firm as consisting of an entrepreneur and his or her 
employees, and he distinguished activities within the firm from transactions 
between the firm and other actors.  However, the predominant view of the 
firm for the last several decades has been the “nexus of contracts” concept.  
The nexus of contracts concept views the firm as a web of explicit and 
implicit contracts, which includes suppliers of capital, services, and goods 
together with the purchasers of output.  The nexus of contracts approach 
downplays the distinction between suppliers of services who are employees 
and suppliers who are not.  It also questions whether suppliers of equity 
capital are “owners” of the firm in any meaningful sense.  The nexus of 
contracts concept rejects the categorical distinction between activity 
“inside” the Coasean firm and activity “outside” the firm.   
Section IV will develop a two-stage test for determining the 
boundaries of a single entity for the purposes of Section One.  The test 
relies on an analysis of the likelihood of incentives for efficiency.  Sharing 
of net profits creates incentives for efficiency, so parties who share net 
profits should be part of the single entity.  Persons significantly controlled 
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by parties who share net profits should also be included in the single entity.  
This is because the people who have the incentive to seek efficiency 
control the people who lack that incentive.  Finally, Section V will apply 
the tests developed in the preceding section to the facts of Supreme Court 
cases addressing the single entity concept. 
I.  THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGREEMENT CONTROLS WHETHER THE 
COMPETITIVE EFFECT OF MOST BEHAVIOR WILL BE ANALYZED 
The structure of the Sherman Act prohibits a single inquiry into 
whether conduct is anticompetitive.  The Act is divided into two sections, 
each of which gives rise to claims with two elements.  Section One 
prohibits all contracts, conspiracies, and combinations which unreasonably 
restrain trade.
1
  The first element of a claim under Section One is the 
existence of an agreement between two or more actors.  Evidence of an 
express agreement may directly prove an agreement.  Express agreements 
are sometimes contained in written contracts.
2
  Express agreements are also 
contained in rules or bylaws adopted by organizations in order to govern 
the conduct of their members.
3
  Section One cases involving such direct 
proof of agreements turn on the analysis of whether the uncontroverted 
agreement is a reasonable one.   
However, parties often vigorously contest the existence of an 
agreement.  Courts have struggled with the standard for when conduct of 
the parties indicates the existence of an agreement.
4
  Such conduct can 
occur both in the context of alleged agreements among competitors
5
 and in 
the context of alleged agreements between buyers and sellers.
6
  In resolving 
 
1.    15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 2.  See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 2 (1979) 
(recognizing that agreements can be manifested in the form of blanket license agreements). 
 3.  See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 679 (1978) 
(holding that a canon of ethics amounts to an agreement among competitors). 
 4.  Compare Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939) 
(stating that knowingly participating in mutually dependent parallel behavior constitutes an 
agreement), with Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-554 (2007) (determining 
that interdependent parallel action among telephone companies is not enough, by itself, to 
constitute an agreement), and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763-
66 (1984) (discussing standards for inferring an agreement from communications between 
manufacturers and distributors), and United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306-07 
(1919) (holding that a manufacturer’s refusals to deal with retailers, who sold its products 
below a certain price, does not constitute agreements with those retailers). 
 5.  See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 214, 221 (alleging an agreement between 
competitors in the film distribution business); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549, 551 (alleging an 
agreement between competitors in the telephone service carrier business). 
 6.  See, e.g., Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 755-57 (alleging an agreement between a 
manufacturer of chemical herbicides and the distributers who bought the herbicides); 
Colgate, 250 U.S. at 302 (alleging an agreement between a manufacturer of toiletries and 
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these cases, courts analyze the reasons that concerted behavior 
7
 is subject 
to scrutiny under Section One. 
The Supreme Court has noted that: 
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly 
than unilateral behavior is readily appreciated.  Concerted 
activity is inherently fraught with anticompetitive risk.  It 
deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of 
decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands.  In any 
conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their 
own interests separately combine to act as one for their common 
benefit.  This not only reduces the diverse directions in which 
economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic 
power moving in one particular direction. Of course, such 
merging of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit 
consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient to 
warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.
8
 
The second element of a claim under Section One of the Sherman Act 
is that the agreement unreasonably restrain trade.
9
  The usual test for 
determining the legality of an agreement under Section One is called the 
rule of reason. 
The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a 
practice restrains trade in violation of § 1:   
 
Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of 
a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be 
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.  
Appropriate factors to take into account include “specific 
information about the relevant business” and “the restraint’s 
history, nature, and effect.”  Whether the businesses involved 
have market power is a further, significant consideration.  In its 
design and function the rule distinguishes between restraints with 
anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and 
restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best 
 
the wholesale/retail merchants it distributed to).  
7.   “Concerted behavior” is a conventional shorthand for conduct amounting to an 
agreement under Section One. 
 8.  Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984). 
 9.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  See also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (“Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits ‘[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States.’  While § 1 could be interpreted to proscribe all 
contracts, the Court has never ‘taken a literal approach to [its] language.’  Rather, the Court 
has repeated time and again that § 1 ‘outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.’”) (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 1; Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 
10 (1997)). 
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interest.
10
 
 
Assessing the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of an agreement 
under the rule of reason can be burdensome.  To limit this burden, courts 
assess more straightforward agreements without extensive market analysis, 
under the “quick look” version of the rule of reason.
11
 
 Some categories of agreements are subject to neither the full-blown 
nor the quick look version of the rule of reason.  Rather, courts deem these 
agreements illegal per se.  Agreements subject to per se treatment include 
price fixing agreements by competitors
12
 and agreements that allocate 
markets among competitors.
13
  Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has 
reduced the number of agreements subject to per se illegality.  It has done 
this by eliminating per se rules or limiting their application.
14
  The Court 
has stated its preference for the rule of reason over per se treatment in 
strong terms: 
Resort to per se rules is confined to restraints, like those 
mentioned, “that would always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output.”  To justify a per se prohibition 
a restraint must have “manifestly anticompetitive” effects, and 
 
 10.  Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885-86 (citing Texaco, 547 U.S. at 5) (quoting Cont’l T. V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Khan, 522 U.S. at 10; Copperweld, 467 
U.S. at 768; Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006)). 
 11.  See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 
(1986) (explaining that a lack of elaborate market analysis does not invalidate a finding of a 
violation of the rule of reason); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109, 110 n.39 (1984) (noting that the rule of reason may be 
applied in the “twinkling of an eye” when anticompetitive effects are obvious); Nat’l Soc’y 
of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (noting that some agreements 
are so plainly anticompetitive that an elaborate analysis is not needed).  But see Cal. Dental 
Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999) (holding that a quick look analysis 
is improper where the anticompetitive effects of a given restraint are not intuitively 
obvious). 
 12.  See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (“Under 
the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, 
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign 
commerce is illegal per se.”).  
 13.  See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (“One of the 
classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors at the 
same level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition.”).   
 14.  See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893-94 (establishing that per se illegality is 
unwarranted for vertical agreements to fix minimum resale prices because both 
precompetitive and anticompetitive are possible); Khan, 522 U.S. at 18 (concluding that the 
economic justification for per se invalidation of vertical maximum price fixing is 
insufficient); GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57 (overturning per se treatment for vertical non-
price restraints); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 n.33 
(1979) (limiting application of per se treatment only to those alleged restraints with which 
the court has considerable experience). 
502 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
“lack . . . any redeeming virtue[.]” 
As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after 
courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint 
at issue, and only if courts can predict with confidence that it 
would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule 
of reason[.]  It should come as no surprise, then, that “we have 
expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to 
restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where 
the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately 
obvious.”  And, as we have stated, a “departure from the rule-of-
reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic 
effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”
15
 
The preference for rule of reason treatment over per se rules on the 
question of reasonableness is conceptually related to whether an agreement 
exists at all.  When a court finds an agreement per se illegal, it does not 
reach the question of whether that agreement is reasonable.  The Supreme 
Court’s hesitance to cut off an inquiry into the facts regarding the 
competitive effect of an agreement is understandable.  A court will also 
forego a factual inquiry into the anticompetitive effects of conduct if it 
determines that an agreement does not exist.  As with a per se illegality 
finding, if courts find that no agreement exists under Section One, the 
reasonableness question is never reached. It would be understandable if 
courts would be hesitant to cut off an inquiry into the competitive effects of 
conduct by concluding that an agreement is lacking. 
Section Two of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization and 
attempted monopolization.
16
 A monopolization claim under Section Two 
has two elements.  First, the defendant must have monopoly power.  
Second, the defendant must have acquired or maintained that power by 
means that are deemed unlawful under Section Two.
17
  While an agreement 
 
 15.  Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886-887 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 
U.S. 717, 723 (1988); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 
U.S. 284, 289 (1985); GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50, 58-59; Khan, 522 U.S. at 10) (citing 
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); Broad. Music, Inc., 441 
U.S. at 9; White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).  The strength of the 
Court’s preference for the rule of reason over per se rules is emphasized by the fact that this 
quotation comes from a case in which the Court overturned a per se rule that had been in 
existence for almost a century. 
 16.  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  Section Two also prohibits conspiracies to monopolize.  Id.  
Such conspiracies to monopolize would also be prohibited as conspiracies in unreasonable 
restraint of trade under Section One.   
 17.  See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns., Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009) 
(stating that the acquisition of monopoly power must have been willful, and not simply a 
consequence of natural business growth or development, to be a Section Two violation).  A 
claim for attempted monopolization under Section Two generally requires that (1) the 
defendant be dangerously close to the acquisition of monopoly power, (2) that the defendant 
engage in conduct condemned under Section Two, and (3) that the defendant have the 
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between two or more parties is required for a claim under Section One, 
unilateral conduct is actionable under Section Two.  Thus, the structure of 
the Sherman Act prevents an inquiry into whether conduct is 
anticompetitive, unless that conduct is either the product of an agreement 
or is undertaken by a defendant who either has or is dangerously close to 
acquiring monopoly power.  Unilateral conduct undertaken by a defendant, 
who neither has nor is close to acquiring monopoly power, is legal under 
the Act without regard to whether that conduct is procompetitive or 
anticompetitive. 
Since relatively few firms have monopoly power or are dangerously 
close to acquiring it, the agreement question under Section One controls 
whether courts can assess the competitive effects of business behavior in 
the vast majority of situations.  If an agreement is present, courts typically 
apply the rule of reason to determine whether challenged behavior is net 
procompetitive or anticompetitive.  In relatively few settings, courts will 
apply per se rules to condemn agreements.  If an agreement is not present, 
a court cannot assess the competitive effects of the challenged behavior 
under Section One.  The presence of an agreement is a threshold that must 
be crossed before the competitive effects of business behavior can be 
analyzed under Section One. 
A perplexing question arises in the application of the agreement 
requirement that goes to the heart of the two-section division of the 
Sherman Act.  Are there instances in which the concerted conduct of two or 
more parties should be deemed that of a single actor and thus shielded from 
scrutiny under Section One?  The behavior could potentially be examined 
under Section Two, but only if the defendant had or was close to having 
monopoly power.  The law unequivocally allows the fiction of a single 
entity to shield multiple actors within a firm under Section One.  No matter 
how many shareholders, directors, and employees a single firm has, The 
Sherman Act treats them as a single person.  Their meetings, memoranda, 
emails, and conversations about the firm’s business are deemed unilateral 
actions automatically lawful under Section One.  This conclusion is a legal 
fiction.  Owners, managers, and employees of a firm are distinct natural 
persons.  If they agree together to sell illegal drugs or commit a murder, 
they are guilty of criminal conspiracy.  However, the policy of the Sherman 
Act protects the competitive consequences of their conduct within the firm 
from assessment under Section One.  This article analyzes the rationale of 
this rule. 
 
specific intent to monopolize.  Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S 447, 456 
(1993). 
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II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FICTION OF THE SINGLE ENTITY 
The Supreme Court has addressed the single entity fiction in two 
cases.  In one of these cases, the Court concluded that single entity 
treatment was appropriate, over a vigorous dissent by Justice Stevens.  In 
the other, the Court reached the opposite conclusion in a unanimous 
decision authored by Justice Stevens. 
A. Wholly Owned Subsidiaries Are Part of the Parent Corporation 
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., a new entrant to a 
market sued several defendants for conspiring to impede its entry.
18
  The 
defendants included a parent corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary, and 
a potential supplier to the plaintiff.  The jury determined that the potential 
supplier had not joined the conspiracy.
19
  This left the parent corporation 
and its wholly owned subsidiary as the only two potential participants in 
the conspiracy.  The jury had been instructed that a parent corporation and 
its wholly owned subsidiary were sometimes capable of conspiring under 
Section One of the Sherman Act, and the jury concluded that such a 
conspiracy existed.
20
  Thus, the question before the Court on appeal was 
whether a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary could 
conspire under Section One. 
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court acknowledged that 
earlier rulings indicated that parent corporations and wholly owned 
subsidiaries were capable of conspiring under Section One.  Chief Justice 
Burger reasoned that this “problem”
21
 began with United States v. Yellow 
Cab Co.
22
  Yellow Cab involved an alleged conspiracy among an individual 
and several corporations he controlled.  The case contains broad language 
suggesting that the corporate affiliations of alleged conspirators are 
irrelevant to the question of whether a conspiracy exists.
23
  The Copperweld 
 
 18.  Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 755-57 (1984). 
 19.  Id. at 757-58. 
 20.  Id. at 757-58, 759 n.2. 
 21.  Id. at 760. 
 22.  United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). 
 23.  See id. at 227-228 (“The test of illegality under the Act is the presence or absence 
of an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce. Such a restraint may result as readily 
from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common ownership as 
from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise independent. Similarly, any affiliation or 
integration flowing from an illegal conspiracy cannot insulate the conspirators from the 
sanctions which Congress has imposed. The corporate interrelationships of the conspirators, 
in other words, are not determinative of the applicability of the Sherman Act. That statute is 
aimed at substance rather than form.   
  And so in this case, the common ownership and control of the various corporate 
appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged combination and conspiracy from the impact 
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Court acknowledged Yellow Cab’s suggestion, but found that corporate 
affiliation was only irrelevant when considering the original acquisition of 
a corporation, not its subsequent operation: 
 
It has long been clear that a pattern of acquisitions may itself 
create a combination illegal under § 1, especially when an 
original anticompetitive purpose is evident from the affiliated 
corporations’ subsequent conduct.  The Yellow Cab passage is 
most fairly read in light of this settled rule.  In Yellow Cab, the 
affiliation of the defendants was irrelevant because the original 
acquisitions were themselves illegal.24 
The Court in Copperweld found that subsequent cases expanded 
Yellow Cab’s holding, thereby supporting the broader proposition that 
parent corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries were capable of 
conspiring under Section One beyond the potentially illegal original 
acquisition: 
The ambiguity of the Yellow Cab holding yielded the one case 
giving support to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.  In 
Kiefer–Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., the Court 
held that two wholly owned subsidiaries of a liquor distiller were 
guilty under § 1 of the Sherman Act for jointly refusing to supply 
a wholesaler who declined to abide by a maximum resale pricing 
scheme.  The Court offhandedly dismissed the defendants’ 
argument that “their status as ‘mere instrumentalities of a single 
manufacturing-merchandizing unit’ makes it impossible for them 
to have conspired in a manner forbidden by the Sherman Act.”  
With only a citation to Yellow Cab and no further analysis, the 
Court stated that the “suggestion runs counter to our past 
decisions that common ownership and control does not liberate 
corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws” and stated that 
this rule was “especially applicable” when defendants “hold 
themselves out as competitors.” 
Unlike the Yellow Cab passage, this language does not pertain 
to corporations whose initial affiliation was itself unlawful.
25
 
 
of the Act. The complaint charges that the restraint of interstate trade was not only effected 
by the combination of the appellees but was the primary object of the combination. The 
theory of the complaint, to borrow language from United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 
26, 57, is that ‘dominating power’ over the cab operating companies ‘was not obtained by 
normal expansion to meet the demands of a business growing as a result of superior and 
enterprising management, but by deliberate, calculated purchase for control.’ If that theory 
is borne out in this case by the evidence, coupled with proof of an undue restraint of 
interstate trade, a plain violation of the Act has occurred.”) (internal citation omitted)). 
 24.  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 761 (internal footnote omitted). 
 25.  Id. at 763-764 (internal footnote and citation omitted). 
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However, the Court concluded that Yellow Cab, Kiefer-Stewart, and 
other cases involving alleged conspiracies among affiliated corporations
26
 
did not prevent reconsideration of the issue: “In short, while this Court has 
previously seemed to acquiesce in the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, 
it has never explored or analyzed in detail the justifications for such a rule; 
the doctrine has played only a relatively minor role in the Court’s Sherman 
Act holdings.”
27
 
The Court began reconsidering whether parent corporations and their 
wholly owned subsidiaries were capable of conspiring under Section One 
by describing the difference between the two sections of the Sherman Act.  
“The Sherman Act contains a ‘basic distinction between concerted and 
independent action.’  The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone 
and is unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization.”
28
  The Court 
explained that limited coverage of unilateral conduct under the Act was 
motivated by a concern over false positives; in other words, courts would 
erroneously proscribe procompetitive conduct: 
In part because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust 
competition from conduct with long-run anticompetitive effects, 
Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only 
when they pose a danger of monopolization.  Judging unilateral 
conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will 
dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive 
entrepreneur.
29
 
The Court explained its stricter assessment of concerted behavior in a 
well-known passage setting forth the reasons concerted behavior raises 
competitive concerns: 
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly 
than unilateral behavior is readily appreciated.  Concerted 
activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk.  It 
deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of 
decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands.  In any 
conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their 
own interests separately are combining to act as one for their 
common benefit.  This not only reduces the diverse directions in 
 
 26.  See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951) 
(holding that agreements providing for an aggregation of trade restraints are illegal under 
the Act and the fact that the agreement was created pursuant to a joint venture will not save 
it); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968) (holding that 
even common ownership cannot save the parties from the legal obligations imposed on 
separate entities).  
 27.  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 766. 
 28.  Id. at 767 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 
(1984)) (internal footnote omitted). 
 29.  Id. at 767-68. 
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which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the 
economic power moving in one particular direction.  Of course, 
such mergings of resources may well lead to efficiencies that 
benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient 
to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.
30
 
The Court went on to address whether officers and employees of a 
corporation represent separate actors.  The Court reasoned that the 
language of Section One does not foreclose treating officers and employees 
of a single firm as actors capable of conspiracy.  But the Court found that 
such a reading was not supported by the policy underlying the Sherman 
Act: 
Nothing in the literal meaning of [Section One] excludes 
coordinated conduct among officers or employees of the same 
company.  But it is perfectly plain that an internal “agreement” to 
implement a single, unitary firm’s policies does not raise the 
antitrust dangers that § 1 was designed to police.  The officers of 
a single firm are not separate economic actors pursuing separate 
economic interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly 
bring together economic power that was previously pursuing 
divergent goals.
31
 
 
Under this view, officers and employees of a single firm are not 
capable of conspiring because they are pursing the interests of the firm 
rather than their own interests.  The Court went on to explain that a 
corporation that groups its officers and employees into unincorporated 
divisions does nothing to alter this result.
32
 
The Court then addressed whether it should treat wholly owned 
subsidiaries differently.  The Court concluded that it would not: 
A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity 
of interest.  Their objectives are common, not disparate; their 
general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two 
separate corporate consciousnesses, but one.  They are not unlike 
a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a 
single driver.  With or without a formal “agreement,” the 
subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder.  
If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do “agree” to a course 
of action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that 
had previously served different interests, and there is no 
justification for § 1 scrutiny.
33
 
 
 30.  Id. at 768-69. 
 31.  Id. at 769. 
 32.  Id. at 770-71. 
 33.  Id. at 771. 
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Thus, although Section One authorizes scrutiny of mergings of 
interests, further scrutiny is forbidden once those interests are merged. 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented in 
Copperweld.  He cautioned against overturning precedent and argued that 
the majority had erroneously minimized the holdings of earlier cases.
34
  
Justices Stevens also relied on the breadth of the statutory language 
addressing the agreement requirement.
35
  He argued that the statutory 
language reflected a common law context in which legally separate persons 
were capable of conspiring together.
36
  The statute’s expressed concern 
with trusts also informed his position, because that concern also addressed 
affiliated corporations.
37
 
Justice Stevens concluded that a parent and subsidiary are capable of 
conspiring under Section One by relying on policy that distinguishes 
between two different types of internal agreements:  those which solely 
eliminate competition between agreeing parties and those which tend to 
exclude competitors.  Price fixing is an example of the first type of 
 
 34.  See id. at 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the rule announced today is 
inconsistent with what this Court has held on at least seven previous occasions.”). 
 35.  See id. at 784-785 (“The language of § 1 of the Sherman Act is sweeping in its 
breadth: ‘Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, . . . is declared to be illegal.’  This 
Court has long recognized that Congress intended this language to have a broad sweep, 
reaching any form of combination: ‘[I]n view of the many new forms of contracts and 
combinations which were being evolved from existing economic conditions, it was deemed 
essential by an all-embracing enumeration to make sure that no form of contract or 
combination by which an undue restraint of interstate or foreign commerce was brought 
about could save such restraint from condemnation.  The statute under this view evidenced 
the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts, whether resulting from 
combination or otherwise, which did not unduly restrain interstate or foreign commerce, but 
to protect that commerce from being restrained by methods, whether old or new, which 
would constitute an interference that is an undue restraint.’”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1; 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911)). 
 36.  See id. at 785-86 (“Since the statute was written against the background of the 
common law, reference to the common law is particularly enlightening in construing the 
statutory requirement of a ‘contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy.’  Under the common law, the question whether affiliated corporations constitute 
a plurality of actors within the meaning of the statute is easily answered.  The well-settled 
rule is that a corporation is a separate legal entity; the separate corporate form cannot be 
disregarded.  The Congress that passed the Sherman Act was well acquainted with this rule.  
Thus it has long been the law of criminal conspiracy that the officers of even a single 
corporation are capable of conspiring with each other or the corporation.  This Court has 
held that a corporation can conspire with its employee, and that a labor union can ‘combine’ 
with its business agent within the meaning of § 1.”) (internal citation and footnotes omitted). 
 37.  See id. at 787 (“Holding that affiliated corporations cannot constitute a plurality of 
actors is also inconsistent with the objectives of the Sherman Act.  Congress was 
particularly concerned with ‘trusts,’ hence it named them in § 1 as a specific form of 
‘combination’ at which the statute was directed.  Yet ‘trusts’ consisted of affiliated 
corporations.”). 
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agreement.
38
  Boycotts
39
 and exclusive dealing arrangements
40
 are examples 
of the second type.  Justice Stevens argued that agreements eliminating 
competition between a parent corporation and its subsidiary should be 
legal: 
The Court’s reason for rejecting the concept of a combination or 
conspiracy among a parent corporation and its wholly owned 
subsidiary is that it elevates form over substance — while in form 
the two corporations are separate legal entities, in substance they 
are a single integrated enterprise and hence cannot comprise the 
plurality of actors necessary to satisfy § 1.  In many situations the 
Court’s reasoning is perfectly sensible, for the affiliation of 
corporate entities often is procompetitive precisely because, as 
the Court explains, it enhances efficiency.  A challenge to 
conduct that is merely an incident of the desirable integration that 
accompanies such affiliation should fail.
41
 
However, Justice Stevens argued that an agreement between a parent 
corporation and its subsidiary that tends to exclude rivals should potentially 
be illegal under Section One.  He used the Copperweld facts to demonstrate 
his point: 
In this case, it may be that notices to potential suppliers of 
respondent emanating from Copperweld carried more weight 
than would notices coming only from Regal.  There was evidence 
suggesting that Regal and Copperweld were not integrated, and 
that the challenged agreement had little to do with achieving 
procompetitive efficiencies and much to do with protecting 
Regal’s market position.  The Court does not even try to explain 
why their common ownership meant that Copperweld and Regal 
were merely obtaining benefits associated with the efficiencies of 
integration.  Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
 
38.  Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 347 (1982) (“We have not 
wavered in our enforcement of the per se rule against price fixing.”).  
 39.  See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (“Group 
boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to 
be in the forbidden category.  They have not been saved by allegations that they were 
reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor by a failure to show that they ‘fixed or 
regulated prices, parcelled out or limited production, or brought about a deterioration in 
quality.’  Even when they operated to lower prices or temporarily to stimulate competition 
they were banned.  For, as this Court said in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, ‘such 
agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and 
thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.’) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 40.  See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) 
(“Standard’s use of the [exclusive requirement] contracts creates just such a potential clog 
on competition as it was the purpose of § 3 [of the Clayton Act] to remove wherever, were it 
to become actual, it would impede a substantial amount of competitive activity.”). 
 41.  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).   
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thought that their agreement had a very different result — that it 
raised barriers to entry and imposed an appreciable marketwide 
restraint.  The Court’s discussion of the justifications for 
corporate affiliation is therefore entirely abstract — while it 
dutifully lists the procompetitive justifications for corporate 
affiliation, it fails to explain how any of them relate to the 
conduct at issue in this case.  What is challenged here is not the 
fact of integration between Regal and Copperweld, but their 
specific agreement with respect to Independence.  That 
agreement concerned the exclusion of Independence from the 
market, and not any efficiency resulting from integration.  The 
facts of this very case belie the conclusion that affiliated 
corporations are incapable of engaging in the kind of conduct that 
threatens marketwide competition.
42
 
Justice Stevens believed that the Court improperly adopted a rule of 
per se legality for agreements between parent corporations and their 
subsidiaries.  He argued that the rule of reason could separate 
procompetitive integration from anticompetitive exclusion.
43
 
B. Teams in a Professional Sports League Are Separate Actors 
In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, the members of 
the National Football League (“NFL”) argued that they were a single entity 
for purposes of Section One and were therefore incapable of conspiring 
with each other.
44
  The NFL is an unincorporated association of thirty-two 
independently owned teams.
45
  Each of these firms owns the intellectual 
 
 42.  Id. at 795-96. 
 43.  See id. at 778 (“It is safe to assume that corporate affiliates do not vigorously 
compete with one another.  A price-fixing or market-allocation agreement between two or 
more such corporate entities does not, therefore, eliminate any competition that would 
otherwise exist.  It makes no difference whether such an agreement is labeled a ‘contract,’ a 
‘conspiracy,’ or merely a policy decision, because it surely does not unreasonably restrain 
competition within the meaning of the Sherman Act.  The Rule of Reason has always given 
the courts adequate latitude to examine the substance rather than the form of an arrangement 
when answering the question whether collective action has restrained competition within the 
meaning of § 1.   
  Today the Court announces a new per se rule: a wholly owned subsidiary is 
incapable of conspiring with its parent under § 1 of the Sherman Act.  Instead of redefining 
the word ‘conspiracy,’ the Court would be better advised to continue to rely on the Rule of 
Reason. Precisely because they do not eliminate competition that would otherwise exist but 
rather enhance the ability to compete, restraints which enable effective integration between a 
corporate parent and its subsidiary — the type of arrangement the Court is properly 
concerned with protecting — are not prohibited by § 1.  Thus, the Court’s desire to shield 
such arrangements from antitrust liability provides no justification for the Court’s new 
rule.”). 
 44.  (Am. Needle II) 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 (2010). 
 45.  Id. at 2207. 
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property in their team names and trademarks.  For many years, teams 
licensed their intellectual property separately.  In 1963, the members of the 
NFL formed National Football League Properties (“NFLP”) to license the 
intellectual properties owned by the teams.
46
  Each team has the power to 
withdraw from NFLP.  The revenue generated by NFLP is shared by the 
teams equally or given to charity.
47
  Until 2000, NFLP licensed the 
intellectual property of the teams to multiple apparel manufacturers, 
allowing the licensees to use the team marks on various products.  NFLP 
had granted American Needle one of these licenses.  In 2000, the members 
of the NFL voted to change the licensing policy of NFLP.  Instead of 
granting multiple nonexclusive licenses to apparel vendors, the members 
voted to cause NFLP to grant a series of exclusive licenses.  Pursuant to 
this policy, NFLP granted an exclusive ten-year license to Reebok 
International Ltd. to manufacture hats using the trademarks of the NFL 
team members.
48
  Since the license to Reebok was exclusive, NFLP could 
not renew American Needle’s license to manufacture hats. 
American Needle sued, alleging violations of Section One and Section 
Two of the Sherman Act.  The district court granted summary judgment for 
the defendants, concluding that the NFL was a single entity with respect to 
the challenged conduct.
49
  In doing so, the court discussed the various 
procompetitive reasons that could justify the NFL’s decision to use a joint 
licensing entity.  The court recognized “that supposed efficiencies in 
economic arrangements are more the stuff of the rule of reason than of 
distinguishing between single entities and joint ventures.”
50
  However, 
rather than analyze these efficiencies under the rule of reason, the court 
concluded that American Needle’s Section One claims should be 
summarily disposed of by accepting the single entity argument made by the 
NFL.   
The Supreme Court disagreed.  In a unanimous opinion written by 
Justice Stevens, the Court held that the members of the NFL were not 
protected by the single entity concept, but rather were separate actors 
capable of conspiring for purposes of Section One.
51
  In his analysis, Justice 
Stevens returned to the history of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine 
that he had found so persuasive in his dissent in Copperweld.
52
  He 
concluded that the majority in Copperweld focused on substance rather 
 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints (Am. Needle I), 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 
944 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 50.  Id. at 944. 
 51.  Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. at 2212. 
 52.  Id. at 2210-11. 
512 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
than form.
53
 
In searching for a test for conspiracy under Section One, Justice 
Stevens turned to language from Copperweld that focused on whether the 
decisionmakers were “separate” and “independent”: 
 
The key is whether the alleged “contract, combination. . . , or 
conspiracy” is concerted action — that is, whether it joins 
together separate decisionmakers.  The relevant inquiry, 
therefore, is whether there is a “contract, combination . . . or 
conspiracy” amongst “separate economic actors pursuing 
separate economic interests,” such that the agreement “deprives 
the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking,” and 
therefore of “diversity of entrepreneurial interests,” and thus of 
actual or potential competition[.]
54
 
 
Justice Stevens also drew from Copperweld a concern about the 
separateness and independence of the decision makers and the separateness 
of the economic interests and sources of economic power: 
Thus, while the president and a vice president of a firm could 
(and regularly do) act in combination, their joint action generally 
is not the sort of “combination” that § 1 is intended to cover.  
Such agreements might be described as “really unilateral 
behavior flowing from decisions of a single enterprise.”  Nor, for 
this reason, does § 1 cover “internally coordinated conduct of a 
corporation and one of its unincorporated divisions,” because “[a] 
division within a corporate structure pursues the common 
interests of the whole,” and therefore “coordination between a 
corporation and its division does not represent a sudden joining 
of two independent sources of economic power previously 
pursuing separate interests[.]”  Nor, for the same reasons, is “the 
coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary” 
covered.  They “have a complete unity of interest” and thus 
“[w]ith or without a formal ‘agreement,’ the subsidiary acts for 
the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder.” . . . 
The question is whether the agreement joins together 
“independent centers of decisionmaking.”
55
 
Applying a standard based on separateness of decision making, 
economic power, and objectives, Justice Stevens concluded that the 
members of the NFL were capable of conspiring for purposes of Section 
 
 53.  Id. at 2211. 
 54.  Id. at 2212 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 
769 (1984); Fraser v. Major League Soccer L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2002)) (citing 
Freeman v. San Diego Assn. of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 55.  Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767, 770-71). 
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One: 
 
The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary 
decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic 
power characteristic of independent action.  Each of [the teams] 
is a substantial, independently owned [and] independently 
managed business, whose “general corporate actions are guided 
or determined” by “separate corporate consciousnesses,” and 
whose “objectives are” not “common.”
56
 
The Court found that the league members were at least potential 
competitors in licensing the teams’ trademarks and that in licensing they 
were pursuing their separate economic interests.
57
 
The NFL made a series of arguments contending that the teams had 
integrated their operations sufficiently to justify single entity treatment.  
The Court rejected each of these arguments.  Although the league 
members’ common goal in promoting the NFL brand partially aligned their 
interests, the Court noted that “the teams still have distinct, potentially 
competing interests.”
58
  The NFL argued metaphorically that NFLP was the 
driver of a promotional vehicle pursuing the common interests of league 
members.  The Court rejected this argument as well, responding that 
“illegal restraints often are in the common interests of the parties to the 
restraint, at the expense of those who are not parties.”
59
  Justice Stevens 
noted that a history of cooperation may merely manifest an anticompetitive 
agreement.
60
  The NFL argued that cooperation was essential to the creation 
of the product being sold.  But the Court responded that while the necessity 
of cooperation should be included in the analysis of an agreement under the 
Rule of Reason, it does not necessarily justify single entity treatment.
61
 
Justice Stevens acknowledged that decisions made by NFLP were not 
exactly the same as decisions made directly through agreements among the 
league members, especially since NFLP had its own management and the 
league members shared NFLP’s revenues.
62
  However, Justice Stevens 
reasoned that each league member owned its separate trademarks and, 
without the cooperative activity coordinated through NFLP, each of the 
teams was a potential competitor in the licensing of their trademarks.
63
  
 
 56.  Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771). 
 57.  Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. at 2213. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 2213-14.  
 61.  Id. at 2214. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  See id. at 2214-15 (“Nevertheless we think it clear that for the same reasons the 32 
teams’ conduct is covered by § 1, NFLP’s actions also are subject to § 1, at least with 
regards to its marketing of property owned by the separate teams.  NFLP’s licensing 
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While courts usually treat actors in a single corporation as a single entity, 
Justice Stevens believed that single entity treatment was inappropriate in 
this case because each of the teams were acting to further their separate 
interests: 
Agreements made within a firm can constitute concerted 
action covered by § 1 when the parties to the agreement act on 
interests separate from those of the firm itself, and the intrafirm 
agreements may simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing 
concerted action. 
For that reason, decisions by the NFLP regarding the teams’ 
separately owned intellectual property constitute concerted 
action.  Thirty-two teams operating independently through the 
vehicle of the NFLP are not like the components of a single firm 
that act to maximize the firm’s profits.  The teams remain 
separately controlled, potential competitors with economic 
interests that are distinct from NFLP’s financial well-being.
64
 
Justice Stevens believed that a joint venture in which the participants 
shared profits and losses could merely be a way of running a cartel of 
potential competitors: 
If the fact that potential competitors shared in profits or losses 
from a venture meant that the venture was immune from § 1, then 
any cartel “could evade the antitrust law simply by creating a 
‘joint venture’ to serve as the exclusive seller of their competing 
products.”  “So long as no agreement,” other than one made by 
the cartelists sitting on the board of the joint venture, “explicitly 
listed the prices to be charged, the companies could act as 
monopolies through the ‘joint venture.’”  (Indeed, a joint venture 
with a single management structure is generally a better way to 
operate a cartel because it decreases the risks of a party to an 
illegal agreement defecting from that agreement).
65
 
III. THEORIES OF THE FIRM AND THE SINGLE ENTITY CONCEPT 
The conceptual division of labor between the two sections of the 
Sherman Act depends on a reliable distinction between acts of a single firm 
(Section Two) and the coordinated actions of multiple firms (Section One).  
 
decisions are made by the 32 potential competitors, and each of them actually owns its share 
of the jointly managed assets.  Apart from their agreement to cooperate in exploiting those 
assets, including their decisions as the NFLP, there would be nothing to prevent each of the 
teams from making its own market decisions relating to purchases of apparel and headwear, 
to the sale of such items, and to the granting of licenses to use its trademarks.”). 
 64.  Id. at 2215 (internal footnote and citations omitted).  
 65.  Id. (quoting Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 335 
(2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment)). 
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This distinction requires a definition of what constitutes a single firm.  
Generations of economists and business associations scholars, including 
Ronald Coase, Michael Jensen and William Meckling, have struggled to 
formulate this definition. 
A. Coase Views the Firm as Distinct From the Market 
In his famous 1937 essay The Nature of the Firm,
66
 Nobel laureate 
Ronald Coase pondered what constitutes a firm and why firms exist.  His 
conclusions provide a meaningful foundation for the conceptual division 
between Section One and Section Two of the Sherman Act.  Coase began 
by asking why firms exist at all.  If market transactions allow individuals to 
exchange goods and services at market clearing prices, why do groups of 
individuals exist as firms? Coase states: 
An economist thinks of the economic system as being 
coordinated by the price mechanism and society becomes not an 
organisation but an organism.  The economic system “works 
itself.”  This does not mean that there is no planning by 
individuals.  These exercise foresight and choose between 
alternatives.  This is necessarily so if there is to be order in the 
system.  But this theory assumes that the direction of resources is 
dependent directly on the price mechanism.  Indeed, it is often 
considered to be an objection to economic planning that it merely 
tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism.
67
 
 Within a firm, resources are allocated by direction rather than by 
market transactions.  Goods move from worker to worker on an assembly 
line without negotiation as to quantity, quality, and price.  No offer or 
acceptance occurs.  Different workers provide services to accomplish the 
firm’s goals without service contracts between those workers.  Factory 
workers, sales associates, accountants, and in-house lawyers all coordinate 
their efforts without contracting with each other.  This stands in stark 
contrast to a classical market as the intermediary between economic actors.   
Within a firm, the [market transaction] description does not fit at 
all.  For instance, in economic theory we find that the allocation 
of factors of production between different uses is determined by 
the price mechanism.  The price of factor A becomes higher in X 
than in Y.  As a result, A moves from Y to X until the difference 
between the prices in X and Y, except in so far as it compensates 
for other differential advantages, disappears.  Yet in the real 
world, we find that there are many areas where this does not 
apply.  If a workman moves from department Y to department X, 
 
 66.  R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 67.  Id. at 387 (internal footnotes omitted). 
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he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because 
he is ordered to do so.  Those who object to economic planning 
on the grounds that the problem is solved by price movements 
can be answered by pointing out that there is planning within our 
economic system which is quite different from the individual 
planning mentioned above and which is akin to what is normally 
called economic planning.  The example given above is typical of 
a large sphere in our modern economic system.
68
 
The first task Coase undertakes is to explain why firms exist if market 
transactions are available.
69
  Coase then goes on to explain what determines 
the size of each firm.
70
 In explaining why firms exist, Coase identifies the 
costs of using market transactions.  The first cost he identifies “is that of 
discovering what the relevant prices are.”
71
  Moving goods and services 
within a firm avoids this cost by avoiding market transactions, and 
therefore avoiding the need to determine a market price.  The second cost 
of market transactions Coase identifies is the cost of negotiating each 
contract.
72
  Here, Coase acknowledges that contracts exist within firms as 
well as outside of them.  For example, suppliers of labor contract with the 
firm by agreeing to follow the direction of the purchaser, subject to certain 
limits.  Within these limits, the purchaser may direct the activities of the 
supplier and by this mechanism coordinate the activities of the firm.
73
 
Coase analyzes the possibility of using long-term supply contracts as 
an alternative to forming a firm.  Like forming a firm, long-term supply 
 
 68.  Id. at 387-388. 
 69.  See id. at 388 (“But in view of the fact that it is usually argued that co-ordination 
will be done by the price mechanism, why is such organisation necessary?  Why are there 
these ‘islands of conscious power’?  Outside the firm, price movements direct production, 
which is co-ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market.  Within a 
firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market 
structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who 
directs production.  It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production.  
Yet, having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production 
could be carried on without any organisation at all, well might we ask, why is there any 
organisation?”). 
 70.  See infra text accompanying notes 78-86. 
 71.  Coase, supra note 66, at 390 (internal footnote omitted). 
 72.  Id. at 390-391. 
 73.  See id. at 391 (“It is true that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but 
they are greatly reduced.  A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have to 
make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm, as 
would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result of the working of 
the price mechanism.  For this series of contracts is substituted one.  At this stage, it is 
important to note the character of the contract into which a factor enters that is employed 
within a firm.  The contract is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which 
may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain 
limits.  The essence of the contract is that it should only state the limits to the powers of the 
entrepreneur.  Within these limits, he can therefore direct the other factors of production.”). 
2014] THE ENIGMA OF THE SINGLE ENTITY 517 
 
contracts reduce transaction costs by reducing the number of contracts to 
negotiate and form.   Coase’s assessment of this possibility speaks to the 
idea of bounded rationality, which states, among other things, that at the 
time of contract formation, the parties do not know what the future holds. 
74
 
Coase addresses the possibility that, in the future, the purchaser might want 
to specify which of several courses of action the seller should take: 
Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period 
of the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the 
less possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person 
purchasing to specify what the other contracting party is expected 
to do.  It may well be a matter of indifference to the person 
supplying the service or commodity which of several courses of 
action is taken, but not to the purchaser of that service or 
commodity.  But the purchaser will not know which of these 
several courses he will want the supplier to take.
75
 
Coase identifies one solution to this problem, noting that the contract 
may allocate to the purchaser the power to specify later how the seller is to 
perform.
76
  Coase then notes that as the power of control contractually 
allocated to the purchaser increases, a firm comes into existence:  “When 
the direction of resources (within the limits of the contract) becomes 
dependent on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I term a ‘firm’ 
may be obtained.  A firm is likely therefore to emerge in those cases where 
a very short term contract would be unsatisfactory.”
77
 
Coase then asks why any market transactions exist in  a world where 
firms can reduce or eliminate the cost of those transactions.
78
  What is the 
point at which a firm decides to use a market transaction rather than 
coordinate one more activity within the firm?  In modern terms, when will 
Toyota decide to buy sparkplugs rather than make them, or retain a law 
firm for a legal matter rather than use its in house legal staff?  Coase 
discusses three reasons why the scope of a firm could be limited, even if all 
tasks that need to be accomplished were of the same type.
79
  First, as a firm 
 
74.   Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955). 
 75.  Id. at 391. 
 76.  Id. at 392. 
 77.  Id. (internal footnote omitted). 
 78.  See id. at 394 (“A pertinent question to ask would appear to be . . . . why, if by 
organising one can eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there 
any market transactions at all?  Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?”). 
 79.  Coase acknowledges that market transactions are highly variable.  Id. at 396.  This 
of course means that some types of transactions might be cheaper to organize within a firm, 
while others are especially suited to market transactions.  Coase notes that this would 
explain the division of tasks between intra-firm coordination and market transactions.  
However, he further notes that it would not explain why more than one firm coordinating 
tasks suitable to intra- firm coordination would exist.  Id. 
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attempts to coordinate more transactions, the cost per transaction may 
increase.
80
  If an entrepreneur has to pay attention to more and more steps 
in production, the cost of coordinating incremental steps may rise.  Second, 
as a firm attempts to coordinate more transactions with the firm, it may 
become less effective.
81
  The entrepreneur may make more mistakes when 
paying attention to more steps in production.  Finally, as a firm gets larger, 
suppliers of inputs, whose activities need to be coordinated within the firm, 
may raise their prices.
82
  These suppliers may charge more if their activities 
are part of the purchasing firm than if they are purchased in a market 
transaction.  This is because suppliers of these inputs may prefer to operate 
their own firms rather than be controlled by a larger firm.
83
 
Coase suggests variables that would alter the costs of intra-firm 
coordination compared to market transactions.  He explains that geographic 
distance, task variability, and market price volatility would all increase the 
cost of organizing transactions with a firm.
84
  Technological innovation 
could affect the relative costs of intra-firm coordination versus market 
transactions.  Coase notes the telephone and telegraph as inventions that 
reduced the cost of a firm organizing tasks at a great distance.
85
  Coase 
would likely agree that today’s email, video conferencing, and remote 
computer file access do the same.  Coase makes the point that inventions 
can affect both the cost of intra-firm coordination and market transactions.  
It is the relative size of these effects that impacts the optimally efficient 
size of the firm.
86
  For example, computer-aided manufacturing allows 
cheaper coordination within a firm by decreasing the variability of 
transactions.  It allows a high level of confidence that repetition of a 
manufacturing process will be uniform.  However, computer-aided 
manufacturing allows cheaper market transactions for the same reason.  A 
buyer of a manufactured part can look at a sample of the part for sale by a 
supplier and have a high degree of confidence that the parts delivered will 
be of the same quality. 
Thus, Coase’s explanations of why firms exist at all and why they are 
not infinitely large still hold true in the modern world.  Firms exist because 
coordination within a firm avoids costs associated with market transactions.  
Firms are not infinitely large because coordination within a firm costs more 
as the firm gets larger.  Firms increase in size until the point where the 
costs of market transactions equal the costs of coordinating more 
 
 80.  Id. at 394. 
 81.  Id. at 394-395. 
 82.  Id. at 395. 
 83.  Id. at 395, n.1. 
 84.  Id. at 397. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at n.3. 
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transactions with the firm.
87
 
Coase limited his task to explaining why firms exist and how large 
they become.  In doing so, he assumed that an entrepreneur ran the firm.  
Thus, the Coasean firm consists of the entrepreneur and his or her 
employees.  It excludes suppliers and customers with whom the firm 
interacts in markets.  Although this construction of the firm focuses on the 
boundary between the firm and the market, it does not try to explain the 
boundaries of the firm when more than one individual assumes the 
functions of the entrepreneur.  The modern nexus of contracts construction 
of business associations both questions the boundary between the firm and 
the market and attempts to explain the fracture of the entrepreneurial 
functions. 
B. The Nexus of Contracts Concept Denies the Separation of the Firm 
From the Market 
The entrepreneur-owner performs multiple functions.  He or she 
supplies the capital, bears the risk of losing the capital,
88
 receives any 
profits the business earns, and manages the business.  There is no reason 
why only one person must assume these tasks.  In a partnership, more than 
one person shares each of these tasks.
89
  Partnership default rules provide 
that the partners share financial risks, benefits, and management 
responsibilities.
90
  In a corporation, financial risks and benefits are allocated 
to the shareholders while management tasks are allocated to the directors 
and officers.
91
  The modern law of business associations defines and 
controls these different roles.  For the past several decades, the prevailing 
explanation of business associations has been the nexus of contracts 
theory.
92
  The nexus of contracts theory does not conceive of the firm as an 
entity separate from the market.  Rather, it views people performing the 
various parts of the entrepreneurial function along with suppliers, 
 
 87.  For a comparison of the decision to form a firm to the decision to form a joint 
venture between firms from a Coasean perspective, see 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW 5-7 (2d ed. 2005). 
 88.  In a sole proprietorship, the entrepreneur also bears the risk of losing his or her 
assets in addition to the invested capital. 
 89.  Similarly, in a member-managed limited liability company, members who also 
manage the firm share financial risks and benefits. 
 90.  Uniform Partnership Act §§ 401, 807, 6 U.L.A. 1 (2001). 
 91.  Model Business Corporation Act § 801 (2010).  Of course, the same individual 
may, but need not, be a shareholder, a director, and an officer. 
 92.  For examples of works that advance this theory, see, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK 
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387, 391 (2000); and William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining 
Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982). 
520 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
employees, and customers as participating in a nexus of explicit and 
implicit contracts. 
 The nexus of contracts approach originated in a famous article by 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling.  In Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
93
 Jensen and Meckling 
address how explicit and implicit contracts affect cooperation in 
production.
94
  Cooperation in production takes the form of one person 
acting for another, including situations where two or more people act for 
their joint benefit.  Jensen and Meckling use the term “agency” for this 
concept and address the cost of agency relationships: 
We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one 
or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent.  If both 
parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good 
reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal.
95
 
Jensen and Meckling note that agency relationships and agency costs exist 
in many settings.
96
  The focus of their article is on the agency relationship 
between owners and managers of corporations.  As a foundation for 
addressing this subset of agency issues, the authors discuss the nature of the 
firm as a nexus of contracts: “Contractual relations are the essence of the 
firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, etc.  
The problem of agency costs and monitoring exists for all of these 
contracts. . . .”
97
  Jensen and Meckling emphasize that the fictional 
personhood of a business organization should not distract from seeing the 
web of explicit and implicit contracts among members of the cooperating 
group: 
It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply 
legal fictions, which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting 
 
 93.  3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 94.  Id. at 307-310. 
 95.  Id. at 308. 
 96.  See id. at 309 (“The problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as if he were 
maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general.  It exists in all organizations and in all 
cooperative efforts — at every level of management in firms, in universities, in mutual 
companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in 
relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as those common in the 
performing arts and the market for real estate.  The development of theories to explain the 
form which agency costs take in each of these situations (where the contractual relations 
differ significantly), and how and why they are born will lead to a rich theory of 
organizations which is now lacking in economics and the social sciences generally.”) 
(internal footnotes omitted). 
 97.  Id. at 310. 
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relationships among individuals. . . . The private corporation or 
firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus 
for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by 
the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash 
flows of the organization which can generally be sold without 
permission of the other contracting individuals.  While this 
definition of the firm has little substantive content, emphasizing 
the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations 
focuses attention on a crucial set of questions — why particular 
sets of contractual relations arise for various types of 
organizations, what the consequences of these contractual 
relations are, and how they are affected by changes exogenous to 
the organization.  Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to 
try to distinguish those things that are “inside” the firm (or any 
other organization) from those things that are “outside” of it.  
There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex 
relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) 
and the owners of labor, material, and capital inputs and the 
consumers of output.
98
 
The final two sentences distinguish the nexus of contracts approach 
from Coase’s theory of the firm.
99
  Coase explicitly sets out to distinguish 
the inside of the firm from the outside of the firm.  Inside the firm, the 
entrepreneur directs the activities of the employees.  Outside the firm, 
market transactions take place between the firm and other actors.  The 
nexus of contracts approach rejects the categorical distinction between 
actors inside the firm and actors outside the firm.  Instead, it posits that 
suppliers of goods, money, risk bearing, management, and labor, together 
with purchasers of the output, are part of a web of explicit and implicit 
contracts. 
 Jensen and Meckling agree with the earlier work of Armen Alchian 
and Harold Demsetz in rejecting a focus on the entrepreneur’s control of 
employees as the distinguishing characteristic of a firm.
100
  In Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization,
101
 Alchian and Demsetz 
develop a theory of the firm that focuses on the role of the entrepreneur as 
the supplier of capital and management.  The entrepreneur is the center of a 
 
 98.  Id. at 310-311 (internal footnotes omitted, emphasis in original). 
 99.  On the distinction between the Coasean approach to the firm and the nexus of 
contracts theory, see Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Coase, Knight, and the Nexus-Of-Contracts 
Theory of the Firm: A Reflection on Reification, Reality, and the Corporation as 
Entrepreneur Surrogate, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 1256-1264 (2012). 
 100.  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 93, at 310 (“Alchian and Demsetz . . . object to 
the notion that activities within the firm are governed by authority, and correctly emphasize 
the role of contracts as a vehicle for voluntary exchange.”). 
 101.  62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
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group of contracts and monitors the relative value of each of the inputs.
102
  
As a foundation for this analysis, the authors deny the importance of an 
employer’s control over the employee: 
It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to 
settle issues by fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary action 
superior to that available in the conventional market.  This is 
delusion.  The firm does not own all its inputs.  It has no power 
of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the 
slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any 
two people.  I can “punish” you only by withholding future 
business or by seeking redress in the courts for any failure to 
honor our exchange agreement.  That is exactly all that any 
employer can do.  He can fire or sue, just as I can fire my grocer 
by stopping purchases from him or sue him for delivering faulty 
products.  What then is the content of the presumed power to 
manage and assign workers to various tasks?  Exactly the same as 
one little consumer’s power to manage and assign his grocer to 
various tasks.  The single consumer can assign his grocer to the 
task of obtaining whatever the customer can induce the grocer to 
provide at a price acceptable to both parties.  That is precisely all 
that an employer can do to an employee.  To speak of managing, 
directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a deceptive 
way of noting that the employer continually is involved in 
renegotiation of contracts on terms that must be acceptable to 
both parties.  Telling an employee to type this letter rather than to 
file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand 
of tuna rather than that brand of bread.
103
 
Thus, Alchian and Demsetz, as well as Jensen and Meckling, reject treating 
the employee/employer relationship as categorically different from 
relationships of others in a web of contracts because of the control 
exercised by the employer.  In this way, the nexus of contracts approach is 
different from Coase’s theory of the firm.
104
 
 The nexus of contracts approach differs from the Coasean approach in 
another respect as well.  Coase viewed the firm as consisting of 
entrepreneur and his or her employees.  He did not address the boundaries 
of the firm where multiple individuals assume the entrepreneurial 
functions.  The entrepreneur provides capital, risk bearing, and 
management.  In 1980, Eugene Fama responded to the work of Jensen, 
Meckling, Alchian, and Demsetz by arguing that they did not pay enough 
 
 102.  Id. at 778. 
 103.  Id. at 777. 
 104.  See also O’Kelley, supra note 99, at 1262 (explaining that the nexus of contracts 
approach includes, within the firm, more actors than the Coasean approach). 
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attention to the separation of the entrepreneurial functions.
105
  Alchian and 
Demsetz defined the classical firm as: 
a contractual structure with: 1) joint input production; 2) several 
input owners; 3) one party who is common to all the contracts of 
the joint inputs; 4) who has rights to renegotiate any input’s 
contract independently of contracts with other input owners; 5) 
who holds the residual claim; and 6) who has the right to sell his 
central contractual residual status.  The central agent is called the 
firm’s owner and the employer.
106
 
Fama argues that it is important to recognize the conceptual separation of 
items 3 and 4 from items 5 and 6 on the Alchian and Demsetz list: 
To understand the modern corporation, it is better to separate the 
manager, the agents of points 3 and 4 of the Alchian-Demsetz 
definition of the firm, from the risk bearer described in points 5 
and 6.  The rationale for separating these functions is not just that 
the end result is more descriptive of the corporation, a point 
recognized in both the Alchian-Demsetz and Jensen-Meckling 
papers.  The major loss in retaining the concept of the 
entrepreneur is that one is prevented from developing a 
perspective on management and risk bearing as separate factors 
of production, each faced with a market for its services that 
provides alternative opportunities and, in the case of 
management, motivation toward performance.
107
 
 Fama argues that the risk bearing function is just one of many inputs 
of production that are parts of the nexus of contracts.  Performing the risk 
bearing function and being the residual claimant is not the equivalent of 
owning the firm.  “We first set aside the typical presumption that a 
corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. . . . [T]he two functions 
usually attributed to the entrepreneur, management and risk bearing, are 
treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a 
firm.”
108
  Fama exemplifies the nexus of contracts approach by pointing out 
that owning a firm and owning securities in a firm are distinct concepts: 
[O]wnership of capital should not be confused with ownership of 
the firm.  Each factor in a firm is owned by somebody.  The firm 
is just the set of contracts covering the way inputs are joined to 
create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared 
among inputs.  In this “nexus of contracts” perspective, 
ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept.  Dispelling the 
 
 105.  Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 
288, 289 (1980). 
 106.  Alchian and Demsetz, supra note 101, at 794. 
 107.  Fama, supra note 105, at 291. 
 108.  Id. at 289. 
524 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
tenacious notion that a firm is owned by its security holders is 
important because it is a first step toward understanding that 
control over a firm’s decisions is not necessarily the province of 
the security holders.
109
 
In summary, the nexus of contracts theory of the firm differs from that 
set forth by Coase in two respects.  First, Coase focused on a boundary of 
the firm that separated it from market transactions with others.  The 
entrepreneur and his or her employees were inside the firm.  Suppliers and 
customers were outside the firm.  The nexus of contracts theory does not 
adopt this distinction; instead, it adopts a more complex view of firm 
inclusion that relies heavily on agency principles.  Second, Coase did not 
address the division of the entrepreneurial functions among separate actors.  
Therefore, he did not need to determine a boundary for the firm if that firm 
separated management and risk bearing functions.  In the nexus of 
contracts view, risk bearers, managers, employees, suppliers, and 
customers are all part of the web of explicit and implicit contracts that 
make up the firm.  No subset of this group is categorically separate from 
the rest. 
C. The Single Entity Concept from Coasean and Nexus of Contracts 
Perspectives 
The single entity concept under Section One of the Sherman Act 
creates a rule of per se legality for agreements between individuals within 
the firm.  An agreement between the firm and another actor, such as a 
supplier or a customer, is subject to scrutiny under Section One.  This 
categorical separation between agreements among actors within the firm 
(ignored under Section One) and agreements between the firm and actors 
outside the firm (assessed under Section One) fits naturally in the Coasean 
perspective.  Of course, Coase was not addressing analysis under Section 
One of the Sherman Act when he wrote his article.  He was instead trying 
to analyze why firms exist and what determines their size.  However, his 
perspective that there is something conceptually different about conduct 
within a firm and conduct outside the firm is consistent with the single 
entity concept of Section One.  Both Coase and the single entity concept 
treat the line between the firm and the market as conceptually sound. 
The nexus of contracts approach rejects the importance of the line 
between actors within a firm and those outside the firm.  The nexus of 
contracts approach treats suppliers and customers as part of the same web 
of explicit and implicit contracts as stockholders, directors, officers, and 
employees.  Under this approach, the employer’s control over the employee 
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is not categorically different from the control exercised by any buyer over 
any seller.  Similarly, the firm has no owner who is categorically different 
from any other actor in the web of explicit and implicit contracts.  
Stockholders are merely suppliers of capital and risk bearing services.  In 
this sense, they are not categorically different than suppliers of any other 
input. 
Because the nexus of contracts approach rejects the categorical 
distinction between actors inside and outside the firm, it calls into question 
the single entity concept.  If there is no categorical difference between 
actors inside and outside the firm, why should agreements among actors 
“inside” the firm and agreements between the firm and others be treated as 
categorically different?  Why should agreements among actors inside the 
firm be ignored, while those between the firm and other actors be subject to 
scrutiny under Section One of the Sherman Act? 
Rejecting the single entity concept would take the language of Section 
One literally.  All agreements which restrain trade would be subject to 
scrutiny under Section One, whether those agreements were among 
shareholders, directors, officers, and employees of a firm or between the 
firm and other actors such as suppliers and customers.  An assessment of 
the competitive consequences of the agreements would replace the rule of 
per se legality flowing from the single entity concept.  The rejection of that 
rule would be in accord with the historical trend in which the Supreme 
Court has reduced the number of per se rules.
110
 
In such a hypothetical world, the rules governing scrutiny under 
Section One would need to be substantially revised.  An intra-firm 
agreement among plant managers that the products produced by each plant 
are to sell at the same price would not be per se illegal price fixing.  In 
applying the rule of reason, one of the factors considered would need to be 
whether the agreement included only actors within a firm.  Nevertheless, 
rejection of the rule of per se legality embodied in the single entity concept 
would substantially increase the number of agreements subject to scrutiny 
under Section One.  Whether this is favorable depends on one’s confidence 
in the rule of reason.  While the Supreme Court seems very confident in the 
rule of reason when it rejects or limits rules of per se illegality, it is not at 
all clear that this confidence should lead to the rejection of the rule of per 
se legality at the foundation of the single entity concept. 
One could retain the single entity concept based on one or more of 
several theoretical foundations.  First, one could conclude that Coase was 
right, that control of employees by an employer is categorically different 
from other agreements.  This conclusion has several difficulties for 
 
 110.  See supra text accompanying notes 13-15 (describing the Supreme Court’s 
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purposes of retaining and applying the single entity concept.  First, it 
ignores the power of the intellectual insights found in the nexus of 
contracts perspective.  Second, it leaves unaddressed the issues raised by 
the separation of various aspects of the entrepreneurial role.  It does not 
help in understanding how one should apply the single entity concept to 
shareholders and managers of a business entity.  These are the very 
problems posed in cases such as Copperweld and American Needle. 
A second theoretical basis for retaining the single entity concept is to 
conclude that the nexus of contracts perspective is right, but there are still 
reasons to retain the single entity concept for purposes of Section One of 
the Sherman Act.  The scholars who developed the nexus of contracts 
perspective did so for purposes of understanding the economics of business 
associations and developing rules for their governance.  They were not 
addressing the Sherman Act.  The Sherman Act governs competition in 
markets, but does not expressly address the governance of business 
associations.  It is possible that the nexus of contracts perspective on the 
firm is correct, but there are still Sherman Act policies that lead to the 
conclusion that the single entity concept should be retained as a rule of per 
se legality. 
Rules established under Section One of the Sherman Act attempt to 
assess the competitive effects of agreements.  The rule of reason explicitly 
addresses the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of agreements.  
Rules of per se illegality are based on the conclusion that particular types 
of agreements are so likely to be net anticompetitive that it is not worth the 
effort of assessment under the rule of reason.  Similarly, the rule of per se 
legality embodied in the single entity concept could be based on the 
conclusion that certain types of agreements among shareholders, directors, 
officers, and employees of a corporation are so likely net procompetitive 
that assessment under the rule of reason is not worth the effort.  The 
question is what would be the basis for such a conclusion. 
IV. SHARING NET PROFITS AND EXERTING SIGNIFICANT CONTROL JUSTIFY 
SINGLE ENTITY TREATMENT 
The single entity concept legalizes agreements among owners and 
employees.  The nexus of contracts perspective divides ownership 
functions into supply of capital, risk taking, and management services.  
Some suppliers of capital take limited risk and exert limited management 
because they are holders of debt.  Holders of debt take limited risk since 
they receive a return that does not depend on the venture making a profit.
111
  
 
 111.  At some point, the insolvency of the venture would affect payment of principal and 
interest to debt holders. 
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Holders of debt have a limited role in management.  Loan agreements often 
place limits on the activities of the borrower, but do not usually give the 
debt holder discretionary power.  Owners of equity securities supply capital 
and take more risk than debt holders take.  Owners of equity securities also 
have more management power than debt holders have.  Owners of equity 
securities in corporations elect directors who oversee management.  One 
question raised by the single entity concept is whether the risk bearing 
service provided by owners of equity justifies per se legality for 
agreements related to that risk bearing service.  This question is analyzed in 
subpart A. 
Owners of equity securities exercise some level of control over 
managers, and managers exercise extensive control over employees.  The 
nexus of contracts perspective questions whether this level of control is 
meaningfully different from control exercised by any buyer over any seller.  
The single entity concept leads to the conclusion that agreements among 
owners, managers, and employees are per se lawful.  Subpart B analyzes 
whether the control exercised over employees justifies this treatment. 
A. Sharing Net Profits Induces Cost Savings Sufficient to Justify 
Single Entity Treatment 
Owners of a firm are the residual claimants to the firm’s net profits.  
The default rules for sharing net profits vary among different types of 
business organizations, and there are various levels of management 
authority.
112
  Private ordering often alters these default rules.  Despite the 
variance in default rules and private ordering, sharing net profits induces 
cost savings.  Net profits are calculated by subtracting expenses from 
revenue.  Actors who share net profits have incentives to increase revenue 
and decrease costs.  These incentives justify single entity treatment. 
Actors who are residual claimants to the net profits of a firm are 
deemed part of a single entity with respect to all activities that give rise to 
those profits.  There is a basic difference between actors who share net 
profits and those who do not.  For example, imagine two actors who want 
to cooperate in a business venture.  One owns the building that the venture 
will use.  The other will provide knowledge and labor to the venture.  One 
possible arrangement would be for the building owner to rent the building 
to the person providing the labor.  The rent could be a fixed dollar amount 
per month or a percentage of the gross revenue of the business.  Another 
possibility would be for the two actors to form a business organization in 
 
 112.  Shareholders of corporations have relatively little control.  Partners in a general 
partnership share extensive control.  Members of limited liability companies have varying 
levels of control depending on whether the company is member managed or manager 
managed. 
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which they would share profits.  This business organization could be a 
corporation in which they are both shareholders, a limited liability 
company in which they are both members, or a partnership. 
In the landlord/tenant relationship, each of the actors would try to 
maximize their own returns.  Neither the property owner nor the tenant has 
an interest in increasing the returns of the other.
113
  Each would bargain for 
higher or lower rent.  More importantly, each would try to extract the 
maximum from the other in other terms of performance.  The tenant would 
try to get the highest level of service out the property owner.  The property 
owner would try to provide the cheapest level of service.  Neither has an 
interest in reducing the costs of the other.
114
  It is of course possible to try to 
predict the consequences of this divergence of interest and bargain to an 
efficient result.  However, given the bounded rationality of the actors, such 
a prediction is sometimes difficult. 
The formation of a business organization in which both parties are co-
owners alters the interests of the actors in important ways.  Both actors will 
still try to maximize their own returns.
115
  However, since they are sharing 
net profits, they each have an interest in maximizing the revenue produced 
by the venture, and more importantly, minimizing costs.  Unlike the 
property owner/tenant relationship where costs are borne individually, in 
the business organization context, the owners deduct costs from revenues 
before sharing the resulting net profit.  Therefore, both parties have an 
incentive to improve the efficiency by reducing costs. 
The property owner/tenant scenario and the business organization 
scenario merit different treatment under Section One of the Sherman Act, 
because they have materially different incentives for reducing costs.  One 
way of implementing different treatment would be to say that agreements 
are present in both scenarios and assess the competitive effects of the 
agreements under the rule of reason and any per se rule if applicable.  This 
would allow and require the trier of fact to determine the competitive 
effects of the differing incentives for cost reduction on a case-by-case 
basis.  Another way of implementing the different treatment would be to 
say that an agreement is absent in the business organization scenario and 
conclude that coordinated behavior is per se lawful.  This is the approach 
that the single entity fiction promotes. 
 Three Supreme Court cases show how Section One has been applied 
to scenarios involving varying levels of sharing of revenues and profits.  
Although each of these cases was nominally addressed to whether conduct 
 
 113.  Each actor would have an interest in the other remaining solvent and able to 
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 114.  The statement in the text assumes that the financial terms of the lease would not 
reflect the cost reductions. 
 115.  For example, each will try to negotiate a larger share of the net profits. 
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was per se illegal or subject to the rule of reason, their facts demonstrate 
the importance of revenue/profit sharing on the assessment of competitive 
effects.  In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,
116
 doctors acting 
through their local medical associations agreed to accept a set of maximum 
payments for designated services provided to patients insured by certain 
insurance plans.
117
  Arizona sued, alleging that the agreement was per se 
illegal price fixing.  The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on 
liability and the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion.
118
  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court order concluding that the alleged 
agreement was not per se illegal and its competitive effects would need to 
be determined.
119
  The Supreme Court held that the agreement was per se 
illegal and that the district court should have granted summary judgment to 
the plaintiff.
120
  The Court focused on the lack of risk sharing by the 
doctors: 
The foundations are not analogous to partnerships or other joint 
arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be 
competitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss as well 
as the opportunities for profit.  In such joint ventures, the 
partnership is regarded as a single firm competing with other 
sellers in the market.  The agreement under attack is an 
agreement among hundreds of competing doctors concerning the 
price at which each will offer his own services to a substantial 
number of consumers.  It is true that some are surgeons, some 
anesthesiologists, and some psychiatrists, but the doctors do not 
sell a package of three kinds of services.  If a clinic offered 
complete medical coverage for a flat fee, the cooperating doctors 
would have the type of partnership arrangement in which a 
price-fixing agreement among the doctors would be perfectly 
proper.  But the fee agreements disclosed by the record in this 
case are among independent competing entrepreneurs.  They fit 
squarely into the horizontal price-fixing mold.
121
 
Thus, the Court imposed the per se rule because the doctors were not 
sharing the risks that revenues would be low or expenses high.  The Court 
indicated that if the doctors had shared these risks, single entity treatment 
would have been appropriate.  In Maricopa, the parties to the agreement 
shared neither revenues nor costs.  In an earlier case, the Court held that an 
arrangement in which competitors shared revenues but not costs should be 
assessed under the rule of reason. 
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In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 
(“BMI”), copyright holders combined to offer a blanket license to 
copyrighted music.
122
  Under the terms of the blanket license, a licensee 
could perform all of the copyrighted music of the copyright holders.  
Individual licenses to particular works were available from individual 
copyright holders at prices determined unilaterally by each copyright 
holder.  The plaintiff claimed that the creation and pricing of the blanket 
license constituted per se illegal price fixing, and the court of appeals 
agreed.
123
  The Supreme Court reversed and held that the creation and 
pricing of the blanket license was subject to the rule of reason rather than 
the per se rule.
124
  Unlike the doctors in Maricopa, the copyright holders 
were not merely pricing a product that they individually produced.  Rather, 
the copyright holders created a different product, the blanket license.  No 
individual copyright holder could offer a license to millions of copyrights.  
This difference justified applying the rule of reason rather than the per se 
rule against price fixing.  However, the copyright holders were not sharing 
the risk that costs would exceed revenues.  The copyright holders were 
sharing the revenues from the blanket license,  and ASCAP incurred some 
costs in administering the blanket license and enforcing the rights of the 
copyright holders.  But copyright holders did not share the costs incurred in 
creating the copyrighted works.  This meant that some copyright holders 
could make money while others lost money.  No copyright holder had an 
interest in lowering costs incurred by other copyright holders.  They were 
not residual claimants who shared the risk that profits would be low or 
losses high.  This meant that they were not deemed to be a single entity 
whose actions were per se lawful under Section One.  Of course, many of 
the actions of the copyright holders acting through ASCAP or BMI could 
be lawful under the rule of reason; however, they were not shielded from 
assessment by the single entity rule. 
In Texaco, Inc. v. Dahger
125
 the Court faced a situation where the 
sharing of net profits would justify single entity treatment.  As in Maricopa 
and BMI, the issue before the Court was whether the defendants’ conduct 
was subject to the per se rule against price fixing.
126
  In Maricopa, the 
defendant doctors shared neither revenues nor costs and the Court applied 
the per se rule.  In BMI, the copyright holders shared revenues but not 
costs, and the Court rejected the application of the per se rule in favor of 
the rule of reason.  In Dahger, the parties to the agreement shared both 
revenues and costs of their joint activities.  While the Court was only called 
 
 122.  441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979). 
 123.  Id. at 6. 
 124.  Id. at 24-25. 
125.   547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 126.  Id. at 5. 
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upon to decide whether the per se rule applied, it implied that single entity 
treatment would be appropriate. 
 Dahger involved a joint venture between Texaco and Shell.  Texaco 
and Shell had historically competed in the refining and sale of gasoline.
127
  
In 1998, Texaco and Shell formed a joint venture to pool their resources for 
refining and selling gasoline.  Under the terms of the joint venture, Texaco 
and Shell shared the risk and profits from the venture.
128
  The joint venture 
sold its gasoline under the original Texaco and Shell trademarks.  The 
plaintiffs “alleg[ed] that, by unifying gasoline prices under the two brands, 
petitioners had violated the per se rule against price fixing . . . .”
129
  The 
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.  It concluded 
that the rule of reason applied to the defendants’ conduct and the plaintiffs 
asserted only a per se claim.
130
  In holding that the per se rule against price 
fixing did not apply to the defendants’ conduct, the Supreme Court focused 
on the sharing of risk of losses and opportunities for profits by the 
defendants, and invoked the single entity concept: 
These cases do not present [a per se illegal] agreement, however, 
because Texaco and Shell Oil did not compete with one another 
in the relevant market —namely, the sale of gasoline to service 
stations in the western United States — but instead participated 
in that market jointly through their investments in Equilon.  In 
other words, the pricing policy challenged here amounts to little 
more than price setting by a single entity — albeit within the 
context of a joint venture — and not a pricing agreement between 
competing entities with respect to their competing products.  
Throughout Equilon’s existence, Texaco and Shell Oil shared in 
the profits of Equilon’s activities in their role as investors, not 
competitors.  When “persons who would otherwise be 
competitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss as well 
as the opportunities for profit . . . such joint ventures [are] 
regarded as a single firm competing with other sellers in the 
market.”  As such, though Equilon’s pricing policy may be price 
fixing in a literal sense, it is not price fixing in the antitrust sense.  
(“When two partners set the price of their goods or services they 
are literally ‘price fixing,’ but they are not per se in violation of 
the Sherman Act”).
131
 
The Court’s invocation of the single entity concept was dicta because 
 
 127.  Id. at 3-4. 
 128.  Id. at 4. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 5-6 (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356 
(1982); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)) (internal 
footnote omitted). 
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the only issue before the Court was whether the per se rule against price 
fixing applied to the defendants’ conduct.  In one passage, the Court 
mentioned both the single entity concept and stated that the plaintiffs could 
have challenged the defendants’ behavior under the rule of reason: 
As a single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have 
the discretion to determine the prices of the products that it sells, 
including the discretion to sell a product under two different 
brands at a single, unified price.  If Equilon’s price unification 
policy is anticompetitive, then respondents should have 
challenged it pursuant to the rule of reason.
132
 
In a footnote to that passage, the Court noted that since the plaintiffs had 
not asserted a rule of reason argument, it need not address the possibility 
that Section One did not apply to the joint venture because of the single 
entity concept.
133
  Therefore, while the Court in Dahger noted the 
possibility of single entity treatment for the joint venture and focused on 
the sharing of profits and losses, its holding is limited to the determination 
that the per se rule was not applicable to the defendants’ conduct.
134
 
The single entity theory treats concerted behavior among co-owners of 
a business organization as unilateral only when it is directed toward the 
generation of net profits to be shared by the co-owners.  Concerted 
behavior that is unconnected with the firm, or that affects profits not shared 
with the other co-owners, is not protected by the single entity theory.
135
  For 
example, in Dagher, Texaco and Shell combined their gasoline refining 
 
 132.  Id. at 7. 
 133.  See id. at n.2 (“Respondents have not put forth a rule of reason claim.  
Accordingly, we need not address petitioners’ alternative argument that § 1 of the Sherman 
Act is inapplicable to joint ventures.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 134.  Commentators have struggled with what Dagher means for the single entity 
concept, particularly post American Needle.  See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher 
R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L. REV. 813, 865-67 (2011) (arguing that 
the Supreme Court was careless to reference the single entity question in Dagher); Daniel R. 
Shulman, Another View of American Needle, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 261, 265-69 (2011) 
(arguing that Dagher does not provide guidance on when joint ventures should receive 
single entity treatment); Gregory J. Werden, The Application of the Sherman Act to Joint 
Ventures: The Law After American Needle, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 251, 256-58 (2011) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s holding in Dagher only makes sense if it is viewed as a 
variation on the single entity idea).  
 135.  See generally, Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 134 at 855 (“When a single entity 
is set up by the participants in order to control their actual or potentially separate business 
interests, as in American Needle, then there are multiple entities capable of conspiring for 
antitrust purposes . . . .  Suppose two separate firms create a joint venture and each owns 
half. Depending on how it is structured and presented, a joint venture may appear to be 
single entity with its own name, logo, product, etc.  However, for antitrust purposes, the 
joint venture is a product of concerted action, and actions by the venture management that 
limit the separate business of each firm are conspiratorial to the extent they limit 
competition that could otherwise have occurred.”). 
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and marketing, and shared profits and losses.  Pricing the resulting gasoline 
was part of the activity that gave rise to the shared profits or losses.  Single 
entity treatment for this activity is justified.  However, if Texaco and Shell 
also agreed about the price they would charge for home heating oil, this 
agreement would not be subject to single entity treatment.
136
  This is so 
because Texaco and Shell would not be sharing profits and losses on home 
heating oil and thus would have no incentive to reduce each other’s costs.  
Similarly, the joint venture agreement contemplated that both Texaco and 
Shell would cease refining and selling gasoline individually.  Ceasing 
individual production and sale of gasoline does not itself generate any 
shared profits or losses.  Therefore, the agreement to cease individual 
production and sale of gasoline is not protected by the single entity 
concept.  Its competitive effects will be assessed under Section One. 
This analysis is different from the familiar conclusion that the 
formation of a joint venture is subject to Section One scrutiny even if its 
operations are governed by the single entity concept.  The formation of a 
joint venture is subject to Section One because at the moment of the 
agreement, the agreeing parties have not begun sharing net profits and are 
pursuing their own separate interests.
137
  The analysis in the preceding 
paragraph does not depend on the timing of the agreement.  Rather, it 
depends on whether the challenged activity generates shared net profits or 
losses.  An agreement to fix the price of home heating oil would not 
generate such profits and losses, nor would an agreement to refrain from 
individually producing and selling gasoline.  However, just because both 
such agreements are subject to assessment under Section One does not 
mean that the assessment would reach the same conclusion.  The price 
fixing agreement would be per se illegal.  Courts would assess the 
agreement to cease individual production and sale of gasoline under the 
rule of reason and it would presumably be lawful.
138
 
In summary, the sharing of net profits or losses justifies single entity 
treatment for all activities generating those profits or losses.  This is 
because sharing profits or losses incentivizes cost savings.  However, 
single entity treatment extends only to activities generating the shared 
profits or losses and not to other activities of the parties.  The competitive 
effects of those other agreements will be assessed under a per se rule or the 
rule of reason as appropriate.  Sharing profits or losses is not the only basis 
for single entity treatment. 
 
 136.  Indeed, such an agreement would be per se illegal price fixing. 
 137.  The same can be said of a merger. 
 138.  The joint venture in Dagher had been approved in a consent decree with the 
Federal Trade Commission and the attorneys general of several states.  Dagher, 547 U.S. at 
4. 
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B. When One Person Substantially Controls the Activities of Another 
They Will Be Considered a Single Entity 
Single entity treatment is not only for those who share net profits.  
Employees of a firm who are acting to further their employer’s interests are 
considered part of the firm.  Analyzing why this is so will help determine 
the scope of single entity treatment for other actors cooperating with a firm.  
It is first important to note why employees are not covered by the rule 
analyzed in the prior section about actors sharing net profits.  Employees 
are paid by their employers.  However, employers pay their employees 
regardless of whether the employer is making or losing money.
139
  
Therefore, employees do not share in the risk of losses.  Employees, like 
most other suppliers of inputs to the firm, receive payments that are 
expenses to the firm rather than a distribution of profits. 
If employees are input suppliers who do not share in the risk of profits 
or losses, why are they considered part of the single entity along with those 
who share net profits?  Other input suppliers are not considered part of the 
entity.  Landlords, lenders, licensors of intellectual property, and sellers of 
all sorts of property and services are all separate entities capable of 
agreement with their tenants, borrowers, licensees, and buyers under 
Section One.  Why are employees different?  One possible answer is that 
the interests of the employee and employer are somewhat aligned, even if 
they are not sharing net profits.  However, other input suppliers also have 
interests somewhat aligned with the firm.  Landlords often receive rent 
affected by the gross revenue of the tenant.  Similarly, licensors of 
intellectual property often receive license payments affected by the gross 
revenue of the licensee.  Of course, for a firm engaged in the resale of 
products, its suppliers benefit when the firm sells more.  Indeed, if a partial 
alignment of interests sufficed to make multiple persons a single entity, an 
overt cartel could be a single entity.  Cartelists do not share net profits, but 
they all have an interest in maintaining a high price through concerted 
action.  Therefore, a partial alignment of interests short of sharing net 
profits does not justify single entity treatment and does not explain why 
employees are treated as part of their employer’s firm. 
Another possible explanation for the inclusion of employees in the 
employer’s firm is that the employees owe a fiduciary duty to pursue the 
interest of the employer.  Further, unlike other agents, employees have a 
legal duty to obey orders from the employer about how they perform 
services for the employer.  These are the reasons that Coase believed that 
employees are categorically different from other suppliers.  This difference 
convinced Coase that employees were “inside” the firm and other suppliers 
 
 139.  The statement in the text assumes that the employer remains solvent. 
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(and customers) were “outside” the firm. 
The nexus of contracts perspective rejects this conclusion.  Meckling 
and Jensen concluded that principals faced agency costs because agents 
would be tempted to ignore their legal duties and fail to pursue the 
principals’ interests by shirking and otherwise pursing the agents’ 
individual interests.  Agency costs include the cost of monitoring the 
agents’ performance, the cost of the agents “bonding” their performance, 
and an irreducible cost of the agents deviating from the principals’ 
interests.  Alchian and Demsetz believed that the control an employer had 
over an employee was not different from the control any buyer had over 
any seller.  If an employee does not act as the employer wants, the 
employer’s recourse is to fire the employee.  Alchian and Demsetz point 
out that any buyer can take similar recourse against any seller, i.e., refuse to 
buy any more from that seller. 
The employment relationship may be sufficiently different from other 
supplier relationships to justify single entity treatment under Section One.  
One difference between the employment relationship and relationships with 
other suppliers is in the nature of the contract.  Other suppliers typically 
agree to supply some result.  A supplier of a product agrees to supply the 
product described in the contract.  A nonemployee supplier of a service 
agrees to supply the service described in the contract.  Unless addressed in 
the contract, the buyer does not have the right to tell the seller how to build 
the product or supply the service.  If Toyota agrees to buy tires from 
Goodyear, it gets the tires and does not have the right to tell Goodyear 
whether to run a night shift in the tire factory.  If Toyota agrees to have an 
electrical company rewire a factory, Toyota does not have the right to 
specify which workers do which part of the rewiring.  However, if Toyota 
used its own employees to make the tires or rewire the factory, it would be 
able to direct the employees with respect to the details of performing their 
jobs. 
The agency cost concept correctly asserts that Toyota would face 
monitoring and other costs in making its employees do as directed and not 
shirk.  However, in dealing with third party suppliers, Toyota would face a 
bigger problem.  If Toyota tells the third party supplier to do something, the 
supplier has the legal right to refuse.  The tire supplier and the electrical 
company can refuse to do what Toyota wants and still get paid.
140
  In 
dealing with its employees, Toyota does have monitoring and other costs in 
detecting shirking and other failures of performance.  However, if Toyota 
overcomes these costs and detects the employee’s deviation, it can fire the 
employee.  The employee cannot shirk or defy Toyota’s orders and still be 
 
 140.  The statement in the text assumes that the contract does not give Toyota the right to 
give the order. 
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paid.  Employees might sometimes get away with shirking, but they do not 
have the right to shirk. 
In one sense, this is just to say that Coase was right.  The employment 
relationship might be categorically different from relationships with other 
suppliers.  The legal right of the employer to tell the employee what to do 
allows the employer to make adaptations ex post rather than being stuck 
with an ex ante bargain.  With other suppliers of goods and services, the 
firm bargains ex ante for various contractual rights.  If circumstances 
change, the firm cannot adjust the bargain without the consent of the 
supplier.  With employees, ex post adjustments are possible.  It is, of 
course, true that the employee can quit if he or she does not consent to the 
employer’s directives.  However, the employee cannot refuse the directives 
and keep his or her job.  If nonemployee suppliers are on very short term 
contracts, this distinction might not make much of a difference.  The 
nonemployee supplier with a short-term contract does have the benefit of 
its bargain and can assert its contractual rights.  However, in a very short-
term contract the benefit of the bargain does not last very long.  Like an 
employee, the nonemployee supplier who refuses to accept the directive of 
the buyer does so at the risk of losing its continuing relationship with the 
firm, i.e. being “fired.” 
It is possible that employees will be more willing to accept adaptation 
by employers than nonemployee suppliers with short-term contracts.  
Employees typically make the bulk of their income from their employment.  
Nonemployee suppliers typically do not make the bulk of their income 
from one customer.  In situations where a seller makes the bulk of his or 
her income from one source, adjusting to the termination of the relationship 
is more costly than adjusting to the loss of one of many customers.  In a 
sense, the seller has invested in an undiversified portfolio.  In such a 
situation, the employee/seller is more dependent on the single source of 
income and may be more willing to follow the demands of the employer for 
midterm adaptation. 
It is also possible that agency costs will be lower in an employment 
relationship than in a nonemployee setting.  Agency costs include the cost 
to the principal of monitoring the agent’s conduct to determine if the agent 
is shirking or otherwise not pursuing the interests of the principal.  It is 
possible that these monitoring costs are lower in the employment setting 
than with nonemployee suppliers.  Employees often are performing tasks 
that the employer is familiar with.  These tasks are often performed on the 
employer’s premises.  They are often performed in the presence of 
supervisors.  They are often directed at goals that are very specific and 
short-term.  If the goal is not accomplished, the employer can easily and 
quickly detect it.  If an employee is directed to wash a window, the 
employer will easily and quickly detect if the employee has complied with 
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the order.  All of these characteristics of employment make it easier to 
monitor employees than nonemployee suppliers and thus make it more 
likely that employees will do as the employers direct. 
The contractual right of an employer to direct an employee, the greater 
willingness of employees to accept midterm adaptations by the employer, 
and the increased effectiveness of monitoring by employers justify the rule 
of per se legality that is the foundation of the single entity concept. 
C. The Relationship of the Sharing of Profits Test and the Control 
Test 
The sharing of net profits test analyzed in Part A above concludes that 
parties who share net profits should be treated as a single entity for all 
agreements related to the production of those net profits.  The control test 
analyzed in Part B above concludes that employers and their employees 
should be treated as a single entity for all agreements in which the 
employees are following the directions of the employers to advance the 
employers’ interests.  In an important respect, the control test is dependent 
on the sharing of net profits test. 
The control test does not exist as a separate justification for single 
entity treatment.  Control alone is not sufficient to justify single entity 
treatment.
141
  Control by a party with the incentive to reduce costs and 
maximize net profits is required.  If the controlling party does not have the 
incentive to reduce costs and increase revenues, thereby maximizing net 
profits, the control does not justify single entity treatment.  For example, in 
an overt cartel, the cartel members might agree to obey the directions of 
one person with respect to what quantity to produce and what price to 
charge.  The cartel members might even agree that the controlling person 
could tell them how to produce the cartelized product.  Although control 
would be present, the single entity conclusion would not be appropriate.  
This is because cartel members do not share net profits and therefore do not 
have an incentive to reduce each other’s costs.  Similarly, the person given 
control by the cartel members does not share the costs of all of the cartel 
members and therefore does not have the incentive an owner does to reduce 
costs and maximize net profits. 
The control test concludes that employees are part of the employer’s 
firm because the employer is seeking to maximize net profits.  In the 
simplest situation, the employer is a sole proprietor, i.e., a single living 
individual.  If the sole proprietor has no employees and conducts all of his 
 
 141.  For an argument that control through ownership should be the determining criterion 
of single entity analysis, see Benjamin Klein, Single Entity Analysis of Joint Ventures After 
American Needle, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (2013). 
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or her business alone, the single entity fiction does not come into play.  
When the sole proprietor hires an employee, the single entity question 
arises.  Although the employer and the employee are two people agreeing 
as to various aspects of the business, should courts treat them as a single 
person?  The sharing of net profits test does not come into play, because the 
sole proprietor retains all net profits after paying expenses, including the 
wages of the employees.  The control test comes into play because the 
employer controls the conduct of the employee.  The single entity 
conclusion is appropriate because the employer has the incentive to reduce 
costs and increase revenue and is controlling the conduct of the employee 
to accomplish that end. 
When an employer has more than one owner sharing net profits, single 
entity treatment remains appropriate.  The inclusion of more than one 
person sharing net profit does not alter the conclusion.  Treating all persons 
sharing net profits as falling within the fictional single entity is justified by 
the shared incentive to reduce costs and maximize net profits.  This is true 
even though the various owners do not control each other.  The control of 
the owners over the employees justifies inclusion of all of the owners and 
all of the employees in the single entity because the people with the correct 
incentives control the people who do not share these incentives.  In short, 
the single entity should include all of the people with the incentive to 
reduce costs and maximize net profits and all of the people they control. 
D. Partially Owned Subsidiaries: Testing the Tests 
A difficult and unresolved problem for the single entity theory is the 
treatment of an agreement between a parent corporation and a partially 
owned subsidiary.  This issue was explicitly left unresolved by the Court in 
Copperweld.
142
  In approaching this problem, it is useful to recall the issues 
that are resolved.  If two corporations, A and B, each make five percent of 
the sales in an otherwise highly fractionalized market, an agreement 
between A and B will be assessed under Section One of the Sherman Act.  
The agreement would be per se illegal if it fixed prices or allocated 
customers.
143
  If the agreement is not subject to a per se rule, it will be 
 
 142.  See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) 
(“We limit our inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a parent and its 
wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.  
We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for conspiring 
with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own.”). 
 143.  The per se rule would apply even though the parties had a relatively small 
combined market share.  See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 
224 n.59 (1940) (“[A] conspiracy to fix prices violates § 1 of the Act . . . though it is not 
established that the conspirators had the means available for accomplishment of their 
objective . . . .” ). 
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assessed under the rule of reason and could be legal if it enhanced 
competition.  An acquisition of one firm by the other would, of course, be 
an agreement subject to Section One (and Section Seven of the Clayton 
Act).
144
  However, given the highly fractionalized market and the relatively 
small market shares of the parties, the acquisition will likely be lawful.
145
  
Subsequent to the acquisition, the single entity concept will preclude 
further assessment of the behavior of the combined firm.  If the acquisition 
takes the form of a merger, one of the corporations will cease to exist, and 
after the acquisition, the single entity concept will prevent further 
assessment of the activities of the combined firm under Section One.
146
  If 
the acquisition takes the form of a stock acquisition by A of all of the 
shares of B, B will become a wholly owned subsidiary of A.  Copperweld 
will treat A and B as a single entity precluding further assessment of the 
actions of A and B under Section One.  However, what if the acquisition is 
a partial stock acquisition?  What if A acquires only 60% of the shares of 
B?  Should A and B be viewed as a single entity in this situation? 
How would the sharing of net profits test treat an agreement between a 
parent corporation and its partially owned subsidiary?  A and all of the 
other shareholders of B would share in the net profits generated by B.  
Therefore, the single entity concept would protect agreements related to the 
operation of B.  These agreements would include decisions about what 
products B will produce, what B will charge for those products, and where 
they will be sold.  This conclusion flows from the assumption that all of the 
shareholders of B have an interest in maximizing the profits of B, in which 
they all share.  The single entity concept would not protect agreements 
restricting the activities of A or any of the other shareholders of B, because 
those agreements do not relate solely to the activities giving rise to the net 
profits shared.
147
  Agreements between A and B that restrict what A could 
produce, how much it could charge, or where it could sell, would be 
assessed under Section One.  Therefore, the question under the sharing of 
net profits test is not simply whether a parent and a partially owned 
subsidiary are capable of conspiring.  The sharing of net profits test should 
also be applied in order to distinguish between agreements about the 
activities generating the net profits and agreements restricting other 
activities. 
Should A’s control of B by means of its majority ownership alter the 
 
 144.  15 U.S.C. 18 (2006). 
 145.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES §5.3 (2010) (“Mergers resulting in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have 
adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require no further analysis.”).   
 146.  Courts could assess exclusionary actions of the surviving firm under Section Two 
if the firm acquired or became dangerously close to acquiring monopoly power. 
 147.  See supra text accompanying note 136. 
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conclusion that agreements about the activities of B are protected by the 
single entity concept?  Alternatively, should A’s control of B alter the 
conclusion that agreements about the operation of A should not be 
protected by the single entity concept?  As a threshold matter, it is 
important to recognize that applying the control test does not determine 
these questions.  As discussed in the preceding part C, the control test 
applies to actors controlled by those who are sharing in the net profits of 
the entity.  It concludes that employees of a firm are part of the firm for 
purposes of Section One because they are controlled by the actor or actors 
who have the incentive to reduce costs and maximize profits within the 
firm.  In the case of a partially owned subsidiary, the controlling parent 
corporation is not the entire group of actors who share in the net profits.  
Therefore, the control test does not apply because the controlling party 
does not have identical interests to the group of the actors who are sharing 
net profits.
148
  Since the control test does not apply, the issue depends on 
the application of the sharing of net profits test.  As noted above, the 
application of the sharing of net profits test would ordinarily lead to two 
conclusions: first, that all agreements about the activities related to the 
generation of the net profits are protected by the single entity concept; and 
second, that agreements restricting the activities of the controlling parties 
are not protected by the single entity concept.  The question is whether the 
control by the majority shareholding parent should alter these conclusions. 
The conclusion that the single entity concept protects agreements 
related to the generation of shared net profits is called into question by 
agency cost analysis when one member of the controlling group exercises 
control.  It has been argued that the control exercised by a majority parent 
should lead to the conclusion that the controlling parent and the partially 
owned subsidiary should be treated as a single entity for purposes of 
Section One.
149
  However, agency cost analysis suggests the opposite 
conclusion: the majority shareholding parent could have the incentive to 
cause the subsidiary to operate at a sub-optimal level to protect the interests 
of the parent corporation.  The controlling parent could cause the partially 
owned subsidiary to forego profitable transactions that would benefit the 
shareholders of the subsidiary because it would cost the parent.  For 
example, imagine that the subsidiary has the opportunity to expand 
geographically into a territory traditionally served by the parent 
corporation.  The incremental sales in the new territory would earn the 
subsidiary $100 in net profits but cost the parent corporation the same 
 
 148.  Further, the control test does not apply because, unlike employees, the management 
of the subsidiary does not owe a legal obligation to maximize the interests of the parent 
corporation rather than the entire group of shareholders of the subsidiary. 
 149.  PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 245-248 (3rd ed. 
2010). 
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amount in lost profits.  The parent corporation has an incentive to prevent 
the territorial expansion by the subsidiary because it will lose $100 but gain 
only $60.  It has a 100% interest in its own profits but only a 60% interest 
in the profits of the subsidiary.  Similarly, it may sell to the subsidiary an 
input for $100 that the subsidiary could have produced itself for $90.  The 
subsidiary shares the $10 loss with its other shareholders, so the parent 
corporation bears only $6 of it.  However, the parent shares the $10 gain 
with no one.  The management of the subsidiary could well violate its 
fiduciary duty of loyalty in making these decisions benefitting the parent at 
the expense of the subsidiary.
150
  But agency cost analysis is based on the 
assumption that the agent will sometimes yield to the temptation to seek its 
own self-interest at the expense of the principal.  In this situation, the 
controlling parent is the agent for the group of shareholders of the 
subsidiary.  As an agent, it is supposed to seek the interest of the group of 
which it is a member; however, it has an incentive to breach this duty.  The 
minority shareholders have substantial monitoring costs in detecting and 
preventing this breach.  These minority shareholders face a significant 
information hurdle in detecting the breach.  Further, seeking redress for any 
breach they do detect would require a procedurally difficult derivative 
suit.
151
 
The Sherman Act is not a tool for enforcing corporate law fiduciary 
duties.  However, that is not the issue.  The question is whether a rule of 
per se legality should shield any inquiry into the competitive effects of 
agreements between the parent corporation and the partially owned 
subsidiary.  Per se legality is justified when the group who shares the net 
profits also controls the activities generating those profits.  Is it justified 
when only one member of the group controls those activities, or does the 
potential for increased agency costs mean that a rule of per se legality 
should not be applied?  In the preceding example involving potential 
territorial expansion by the subsidiary, in a world with no agency costs, the 
subsidiary would expand into the parent corporation’s territory.  The 
consumers would benefit from the competition between the two 
corporations.  However, if agency costs prevent this competition from 
occurring, should the single entity concept deem this outcome per se 
lawful?  The sharing of net profits test would conclude that the single entity 
concept should apply.  A potential deficiency in the test is that it relies on 
the assumption that agency problems arising among the group sharing in 
the net profits will be overcome by effective business associations law.  It 
 
 150.  Id. at 233. 
 151.  For discussions of shareholder demand requirements and the potential motion to 
dismiss by a special litigation committee, see Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254-55 (Del. 
2000), Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932-35 (Del. 1993), and Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981). 
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is not obvious that this assumption is warranted. 
The analysis in the preceding paragraph questions whether the normal 
outcome of the sharing of net profits test, protecting governance decisions 
directed at the activities giving rise to the shared net profits, should apply 
in the context of a partially owned subsidiary.  The second question is 
whether the conclusion that agreements restricting the outside activities of 
the parties sharing in the net profits are subject to assessment under Section 
One should be altered when one of those parties controls the activities 
giving rise to the net profits.  Imagine two easy cases.  First, if two 
corporations, A and B, are unaffiliated competitors each making five 
percent of the sales in a highly fractionalized market, an agreement 
between A and B about what prices they will charge is illegal.  Second, if A 
buys one percent of the stock of B, an agreement between A and B about 
what prices they will charge remains illegal.  In this case, the sharing of net 
profits test would allow A to participate in the governance of B by voting 
for its directors.  If a representative of A is elected to the board of directors 
of B, that representative could lawfully participate in deliberations of the 
board regarding how much B should charge for its products.  However, the 
mere fact that A holds one percent of the shares of B would not mean that 
an agreement between A and B about how much both A and B would 
charge for their products would be automatically lawful.  The shareholders 
of A and the shareholders of B are two different groups sharing two 
different pools of net profits.  They are not a single group sharing an 
incentive to minimize a single set of costs yielding a single set of net 
profits.  This conclusion does not change as the percentage of stock in B 
held by A increases, until it reaches 100%.  At that point, there is only one 
group of claimants sharing one set of net profits, and they would be treated 
as a single entity under Copperweld. 
Does it make a difference if the percent of stock held by A gives it 
control of B?  It does not.
152
  A’s controlling B does not mean that an 
agreement restricting the activities of A should be protected by the single 
entity concept.  As discussed in part C above, control is not a separate and 
sufficient test for single entity status.  Control of employees by an 
employer justifies including employees in the same entity with the 
employer.  However, this conclusion does not flow merely from control.  
The employer is a group of actors who share in net profits and therefore 
have the incentive to minimize costs and maximize net profits.  This 
incentive coupled with the employer’s control over the employees justifies 
single entity treatment.  However, control by itself does not justify single 
 
 152.  Others have argued that it does.  See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 149, at 
246 (“The possible dividing lines are substantial ownership, majority ownership, or de facto 
control.”). 
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entity treatment.  Here, the control of the partially owned subsidiary by the 
parent does not meet the requirement that the controlling party shares the 
net profits.  The controlling parent is only one of multiple parties sharing in 
the net profits generated by the subsidiary.  Its interests diverge from the 
group sharing in the net profits generated by the subsidiary.
153
  This 
divergence means that the controlling party is not the group sharing in the 
net profits, and, therefore, it does not meet the relevant requirement.  
Without the controlling group sharing in net profits, garden-variety control 
is irrelevant. 
V. COPPERWELD AND AMERICAN NEEDLE UNDER THE SHARING OF 
PROFITS AND CONTROL TESTS 
In both Copperweld and American Needle, the Supreme Court faced 
the question of whether groups should be treated as single entities for 
purposes of Section One of the Sherman Act.  In Copperweld, the Court 
concluded that application of the single entity fiction was proper.
154
  In 
American Needle, the Court reached the opposite conclusion.
155
  Both of 
these conclusions are consistent with the layered application of the sharing 
of profits test and the control test. 
In Copperweld, the Court faced the question of whether a wholly 
owned subsidiary should be included in the same entity as the parent 
corporation for purposes of Section One.  This question is addressed to 
three different types of agreements.  First, the agreement might only affect 
the activities of the subsidiary.  For example, the agreement might limit 
where the subsidiary could operate, what it could sell and/or how much it 
could charge.  Second, the agreement might only affect the activities of the 
parent corporation for such matters.  Finally, the agreement could affect the 
activities of both corporations. 
In addressing the question of the single entity status of a parent 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, it is useful to remember how 
the sharing of profits test and the control test assess agreements involving 
only one corporation.  The sharing of profits test would include all holders 
of equity securities as part of the fictional single entity.  This is so because 
all of these parties share net profits and therefore have a shared incentive to 
reduce costs and maximize the shared net profits.  Of course, the single 
entity fiction applies only to agreements respecting the activities that give 
rise to the shared net profits.  The control test leads to the conclusion that 
all employees of the corporation should be included in the fictional single 
 
 153.  See supra text accompanying notes 149-151.  
154.   Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 752 (1984). 
155.   Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 (2010). 
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entity for all agreements where the employees are furthering the interests of 
the employing corporation.  This is so for two reasons.  First, the employer 
has an incentive to reduce costs and maximize net profits, and second, the 
employer controls the activities of the employees. 
In the Copperweld scenario, the alleged agreement includes both the 
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary.  The addition of a 
wholly owned subsidiary does not change the outcome under the sharing of 
net profits test and the control test.  Under the sharing of net profits test, the 
creation of a wholly owned subsidiary does not alter the parties who are 
sharing net profits.  If the subsidiary is wholly owned, the parent 
corporation owns all of its equity securities.  Therefore, no one other than 
the parent shares in the net profits generated by the subsidiary.  The parent 
corporation is of course a legal fiction.  Only holders of its equity securities 
share its net profits.  There is only one pool of net profits from which to 
share.  The holders of equity securities issued by the parent corporation 
have the incentive to reduce the cost of all of the activities of the parent 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, thereby maximizing the pool 
of net profits to share. 
The control test also leads to the conclusion that courts should treat 
the parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary as a single entity.  
Because the holders of the equity securities of the parent corporation are 
the only parties sharing the net profits generated by the parent corporation 
and the subsidiary corporation, the control test asks whether those 
shareholders control the employees of both the parent corporation and the 
subsidiary corporation.  The shareholders of the parent corporation elect the 
directors of that corporation.  The directors of the parent corporation 
appoint the officers of the parent corporation, who in turn select and 
supervise its employees.  One of the assets of the parent corporation is the 
stock of the subsidiary corporation.  As the sole shareholder of the 
subsidiary, the parent corporation elects its directors.  This decision is 
either made by the board of directors of the parent corporation or the 
officers of the parent corporation under the supervision of its board.  The 
board of directors of the subsidiary appoints the officers of the subsidiary, 
who in turn select and supervise its employees.  Because the officers or 
board members of the parent corporation select the board members of the 
subsidiary, they can control the management of the subsidiary.  If members 
of the board of directors of the subsidiary attempted to defy the directives 
of the management of the parent corporation, the parent corporation could 
simply remove the members of the board of the subsidiary and replace 
them with new board members who will do as told.  To simplify this 
process, the parent can simply elect its own employees as members of the 
board of directors of the subsidiary.  Therefore, the holders of the equity 
securities of the parent corporation can control the behavior of the 
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employees of the parent corporation and the employees of the subsidiary 
corporation.  The control test concludes that the parent corporation, the 
subsidiary corporation, and the employees of both corporations should be 
included in the same single entity so long as the employees are advancing 
the interests of the corporations and, thus, the holders of the equity 
securities of the parent corporation. 
In American Needle, the Court faced the question of whether it should 
consider the members of the National Football League as a single entity.  
The Court unanimously held that the answer to this question was no.  This 
conclusion is consistent with the application of the sharing of net profits 
test and the control test.  One potentially confusing aspect of the 
application of the sharing of net profits test and the control test to the joint 
activity in American Needle is that the members of the NFL controlled the 
licensing activities involved in the controversy.  However, it is important to 
remember that the control test applies only after the application of the 
sharing of net profits test.  If the controlling parties do not share net profits, 
the control test is not applicable.  Therefore, the analysis must start with the 
application of the sharing of net profits test. 
Members of the NFL did not share net profits, and therefore should 
not have been deemed a single entity.  The joint licensing activity of the 
NFL members pooled only part of the economic activity of the members.  
League members hired players and team staff, entered into stadium 
agreements, sold tickets, and entered into broadcast agreements, all 
separate from the joint licensing arrangement that gave rise to the 
controversy in American Needle.  Of course, actors do not need to pool all 
of their economic activity to qualify for single entity treatment.  
Shareholders of publicly held corporations typically invest only a small 
part of their wealth in the corporation.  If a shareholder of General Motors 
also owns stock in Ford, two things are clear.  First, the shareholder 
qualifies for single entity treatment with all of the other shareholders of 
General Motors.  Second, General Motors and Ford do not qualify for 
single entity treatment together, despite the existence of the common 
shareholder.  All of the shareholders of General Motors are sharing net 
profits and all agreements related to the production of that pool of net 
profits qualify for single entity treatment.  This is true even though each of 
the shareholders has other investments and economic activities.  Single 
entity treatment applies to agreements giving rise to the pool of net profits 
generated by General Motors, but not to other agreements. 
Single entity treatment should not be denied to the joint licensing 
activity involved in American Needle merely because the league members 
have other economic activity that is not involved in the agreement to 
engage in joint licensing.  Similarly, single entity treatment should not be 
denied to the joint licensing activity under the rule that single entity 
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treatment extends only to agreements related to the joint production of net 
profits.  The agreement at issue in American Needle was the joint decision 
to give an exclusive license to Reebok.  This decision related directly to the 
joint licensing activity.  But single entity treatment should be denied to the 
joint licensing activity involved in American Needle for two reasons.  First, 
the agreement giving rise to the joint licensing activity restricted the 
activity of the league members outside the joint venture.  Second, the 
league members were not sharing net profits because they were not sharing 
costs related to the production of the intellectual property subject to the 
joint license.  The facts of Dagher illustrate both of these conclusions.
156
 
Single entity treatment in the context of joint activity applies only to 
the agreements giving rise to shared profits.  Single entity treatment does 
not extend to agreements that limit the activity of parties outside the joint 
activity.
157
  In Dagher, the parties to the joint venture pooled all of their 
gasoline refining and distribution.  They did not refine and distribute 
gasoline outside the joint venture.  The agreement to cease refining and 
distributing gasoline outside the context of the joint venture did not qualify 
for single entity treatment (although it was likely legal under the rule of 
reason as reasonably related to the joint venture).  Agreements about how 
to refine and market the gasoline produced by the joint venture qualify for 
single entity treatment because those agreements give rise to the shared net 
profits.
158
  Similarly, if shareholders of General Motors agreed not to also 
purchase stock in Ford, single entity treatment would not be appropriate for 
this agreement.  The agreement to refrain from buying Ford shares is not 
part of the production of the shared net profits.  In American Needle, the 
league members agreed to license the intellectual property only jointly.  
They did not retain the right to license the intellectual property individually 
as well.  This restriction on the separate activity of the teams is not subject 
to single entity treatment because it restricts the activities of the teams 
outside the context of the joint licensing activity.  However, even if the 
league members had not agreed to restrict their license activity outside the 
joint licensing, the joint licensing would still not qualify for single entity 
treatment. 
The sharing of net profits justifies single entity treatment because the 
parties have the incentive to reduce costs and thereby maximize net profits.  
The incentive to reduce costs creates efficiencies sufficient to justify a rule 
of per se legality.  However, this rationale extends only to situations where 
parties share all of the costs of the joint activity.  In Dagher, the parties 
 
 156.  See supra text accompanying notes 136 -137. 
 157.  See supra text accompanying note 136. 
 158.  The Court did not face this question because the only question presented to the 
Court was whether the agreement was per se illegal.  See supra text accompanying notes 
129-132. 
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shared all of the costs of the refining and distribution of gasoline.  This 
sharing creates an incentive to reduce costs and therefore justifies single 
entity treatment.  However, in American Needle the parties did not share all 
of the costs of creating and licensing the intellectual property subject to the 
license.  The intellectual property in American Needle consisted of the 
trademarks of the teams.  These trademarks had value because of the 
activities of the teams in playing football, and marketing live attendance 
and broadcast rights.  The potential purchasers of hats and tee shirts wanted 
to buy the trademarked products because they liked the football teams.  
They liked the football teams because of how they performed in games.  
The teams did not share the costs of creating the teams and playing and 
broadcasting the games.  Therefore, even if the teams were sharing the 
revenue from the joint licensing activities, they were not sharing net profits.  
Net profits are what are left after all of the costs of production are 
subtracted from revenue.
159
  Because the league members were not sharing 
net profits and therefore did not have an incentive to reduce each other’s 
costs, the rule of per se legality embodied in the single entity fiction is not 
justified.  Further, since the sharing of net profits test is not satisfied, 
application of the control test is not required. 
In summary, the layered application of the sharing of net profits test 
and the control test explains the outcome in both Copperweld and 
American Needle. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the single entity fiction fits comfortably with the Coasean 
 
 159.  A cartel can be run by sharing revenue, but not costs.  Cartelists can use a jointly 
owned entity to make sales and share the revenue from those sales.  The analysis in the text 
explains the importance of sharing costs as well as revenues in single entity analysis.  
Without sharing costs, single entity status is not justified.  As the Court in American Needle 
noted, it would be paradoxical to use the single entity concept to grant per se legality to a 
cartel:  
If the fact that potential competitors shared in profits or losses from a venture 
meant that the venture was immune from § 1, then any cartel “could evade the 
antitrust law simply by creating a ‘joint venture’ to serve as the exclusive seller 
of their competing products.”  “So long as no agreement,” other than one made 
by the cartelists sitting on the board of the joint venture, “explicitly listed the 
prices to be charged, the companies could act as monopolies through the ‘joint 
venture.’”  (Indeed, a joint venture with a single management structure is 
generally a better way to operate a cartel because it decreases the risks of a 
party to an illegal agreement defecting from that agreement).  However, 
competitors “cannot simply get around” antitrust liability by acting “through a 
third-party intermediary or ‘joint venture’.” 
Am. Needle II, 130 S. Ct. at 2215-16 (quoting Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. 
Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 335-36 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment)). 
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view of the firm, that view has been called into question by the nexus of 
contracts perspective.  Even on its own terms, the Coasean view of the firm 
does not address the firm’s boundary when the entrepreneurial functions of 
supplying capital, risk bearing, and management are divided among 
multiple actors.  These are the scenarios that raise some of the most 
difficult single entity questions under Section One. 
A layered test focused on sharing net profits and exerting significant 
control provides a principled basis for explaining the existence of the single 
entity fiction and for analyzing its contours. 
 
